The difficult situation in neighboring Moldova became one of the important topics of the last week. Experts talked about a possible coup d'état and the overthrow of Maya Sandu's power by the pro-Russian movement in the country. What is the probability of such a variant of the development of events, and what is the interest of Russia Told me Oleksandr Kovalenko, military and political columnist of the "Information Resistance" group.
The probability of such events is currently quite high. This is primarily due to the fact that in Moldova there is a wide network of pro-Russian and Russian agents, which are entrenched in the political environment and power structures. In addition, a military contingent of the Russian Federation is stationed on the territory of Transnistria, which is a serious threat to Moldova's independence. And in conclusion, air communication is maintained between Moldova and Russia, which allows agents of the Russian special services to penetrate directly into the territory of Moldova and Transnistria. Let me remind you that in 2021, Semen Pegov, who is wanted by both Ukraine and Azerbaijan, passed through the Chisinau airport in transit in Transnistria completely unhindered. The special services of Moldova did not react to this in any way.
Why does Kishinev not resolve the issue of the return of Transnistria?
This question still remains a mystery to me, and the only answer that does not describe the current authorities in Moldova in the best light is the lack of willpower. In my opinion, Maia Sandu, in all her statements about the fight against Russian influence in Moldova, since coming to power, has done nothing to ensure that this fight has at least some tangible result. She may pay for her passivity. The problem is that not only she, but also Moldova itself can pay with its sovereignty.
Could Russia launch an invasion of Moldova or other countries today?
Full-scale - no, but a hybrid invasion - quite. But this scenario cannot be implemented equally in all our neighboring countries, although in almost all former USSR countries Russia has its own agent network capable of operating in various regimes. Losing in Ukraine, Russia will need to show its importance and role in one of the post-Soviet countries in order to compensate for Ukraine's failure at least in its information field.
New offensive of the Russian army. Has it started and what might its results be in the coming months?
I never called what was announced a major offensive, because it can't be close to that. In terms of scale, the actions of the Russian Federation today are significantly inferior to what happened on February 24, 2022, and the resources used by the Russians are much worse professionally and qualitatively. On the other hand, by concentrating a large number of units in narrow directions, and not on a wide front, the Russians will try to advance to capture territories and later go into blind defense. For such active actions, Russia has a window of opportunity until about March, and their catalysis is expected by February 24. Then the Armed Forces will take the floor.
Why does the West not provide Ukraine with planes?
First, airplanes are not an issue that can be resolved right here and now. An airplane is not a tank, pilots cannot be trained for airplanes in a month and a half.
Second, unlike tanks, airplanes need airfields with Western-style runways and infrastructure. For aircraft, it is necessary to form crews of service personnel, and their preparation also takes a long time. Ukraine will receive the planes, but not earlier than the second half of 2023. And it is unlikely that they will be located at Ukrainian airfields.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that the current rate of ammunition consumption in Ukraine significantly exceeds the current rate of their production. What does it mean?
Currently, Ukraine does not receive from its international partners the entire nomenclature of weapons that are in the composition and balance of the armies of the partner countries. Accordingly, the list of ammunition sent to Ukraine does not include all types of weapons either. Currently, Western countries are transferring their production to a regime close to wartime, increasing the production of ammunition, etc. In turn, Russian troops in the combat zone reduced the number of shots from 70-80 thousand per day in March-April 2022 to 15 thousand per day as of the end of January 2023. The Armed Forces maintain a stable firing rate of 5-6 per day.
The only difference is that 5-6 thousand Ukrainian shots are long-range and high-precision artillery, and 15 thousand Russian shots are old, Soviet anachronisms. And while in the West they are discussing the issue of large supplies of shells to Ukraine and solving this issue, in Russia they are keeping silent about their problems with artillery and its proportional support, as well as the important fact that this problem is not being solved in the Russian Federation. If anyone was not preparing for war, it was Russia.
