Analysts of the American research center RAND proposed steps to the US leadership that could lead to an end to the conflict in Ukraine. This is stated in additional organization called "How to avoid a long war in Ukraine".
RAND is an American non-profit organization that functions as a strategic research center commissioned by the US government, its armed forces and related organizations.
Samuel Charap (Samuel Charap), Miranda Priebe (Miranda Priebe): How will everything end? This issue increasingly dominates the discussion of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Washington and other Western capitals. While the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv and Kherson in the fall of 2022 revived optimism about Kyiv's prospects on the battlefield, Russian President Vladimir Putin's announcement on September 21 of the partial mobilization and "liberation" of four Ukrainian regions served as a stark reminder that this conflict is far from over. solution. Fighting continues on a front with a length of almost 1000 kilometers. Negotiations on ending the conflict have been suspended since May. Its prospects and final result will, of course, largely be determined by the politics of Ukraine and Russia. This conflict is the most significant interstate military conflict in decades, and its evolution will have serious consequences for the United States.
It is appropriate to assess how this conflict may develop, what alternative solutions there may be, including the interests of the United States, and what Washington can do for this.
Some analysts say the conflict is moving toward an end that will benefit the United States and Ukraine. As of December 2022, Ukraine had some fighting momentum and could probably fight until it managed to push the Russian army out of the country. Proponents of this view argue that the risks of Russia using nuclear weapons or war with NATO remain manageable. After being expelled from Ukraine, the punished Russia will have no choice but to leave its neighbor alone and even pay reparations for the damage caused. However, a study of past conflicts and a careful study of the course of the current one suggest that such an optimistic scenario is unlikely.
In their study, RAND Corporation analysts consider possible options for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and how they may affect US interests. The actions of the USA that could affect the course of the conflict are also considered. An important caveat: this research was done taking into account the interests of the United States, which often coincide with the interests of Ukraine, but are not completely synonymous. RAND recognizes that it was Ukrainians who fought and died for the Russian Federation, defending their country. Nevertheless, the US government has an obligation to its citizens to determine how different options for the development of the conflict will affect US interests, and to study their possible impact on the development of the conflict to advance those interests.
Key factors determining options for conflict development
Many analysts put forward scenarios of a short-term end to the conflict — a kind of endgame. While such scenarios are important constructs for thinking about the future, they are of little use in determining which possible conflict scenarios are most beneficial to the United States. It is more useful for American policymakers to consider what specific aspects of the future course of the conflict will affect US interests. Instead of rich descriptive scenarios, we consider five key factors, which determine alternative options for the development of the conflict:
- possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia
- possible escalation of the conflict between Russia and NATO
- the size of its territory controlled by Ukraine
- duration of the conflict
- the form of its termination
In this section, we describe each of these factors, how they can change, and the relationships between them.
Possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia.
The specter of Russia's use of nuclear weapons has haunted this conflict since its inception. Announcing the start of the special operation in February 2022, Putin threatened any country that tries to interfere in the affairs of Ukraine with consequences "the likes of which you have never seen in your entire history." A week later, he ordered a "special combat duty regime" for Russia's nuclear forces. In October 2022, Moscow said that Kyiv planned to detonate a radioactive "dirty bomb" in Ukraine and then blame it on Russia. US officials were concerned that Russia was pushing the story precisely to create a pretext for using nuclear weapons. And perhaps most of all, Western governments were convinced that Moscow was considering the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons (NTWs) in view of Russian losses of its military positions in the fall of 2022. Russia has denied the allegations, but multiple media reports suggested that senior Russian military leaders were indeed discussing the option. Some analysts dismiss the possibility of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons, arguing that Russia knows it is doomed to failure. They point to the lack of valuable military facilities (for example, large concentration centers of the Ukrainian armed forces) that could be effectively destroyed with such weapons, and the risk that these weapons could also harm Russian troops stationed in Ukraine. The use of these weapons could trigger NATO's entry into the war, undermine Russia's remaining international support, and spark massive domestic opposition to the Kremlin. Further, these experts claim that, understanding this, according to the logic of things, Russia should refrain from using nuclear weapons. However, these arguments ignore several points that make Russia's use of nuclear weapons both a possibility that Washington should consider and an extremely important factor in determining the future development of the conflict.
Perhaps more, there is evidence that the Kremlin considers this military conflict almost existential. Ukraine has long been a special category of Russia's foreign policy priorities. Even before February 2022, Russia was ready to allocate significant resources and incur serious costs to achieve its goal in Ukraine. For example, Moscow paid dearly for Crimea in 2014 and for supporting eastern Ukraine. Western sanctions cost it an average of 2% in quarterly declines in Russia's GDP between mid-2014 and mid-2015, and this effect increased as sanctions continued in subsequent years. Putin's decision to launch a full-scale military operation in February 2022, despite clear warnings from the United States and its allies that he would pay a much higher price than in 2014, shows that he is willing to go to even more extreme lengths to achieve his goals in Ukraine. The decision to mobilize 300 Russians in September 2022 may have affected the internal social stability in Russia, which Putin has spent almost 25 years building, which also shows his high level of determination. This stability presupposed the avoidance of powerful destabilizing factors brought about by mobilization, especially with regard to Putin's core supporters. The decision to mobilize was therefore delayed until it was even militarily overdue, to avoid these domestic political costs and the perceived risks of potential unrest associated with weakening popular support for the regime. Putin's willingness to accept these domestic losses and risks underscores the importance he attaches to Russia's interests in Ukraine.
On the other, since the capabilities of Russia's conventional armed forces in Ukraine were largely lost, the non-nuclear escalation potential for Moscow appeared to be limited. If Russia suffers further large-scale losses on the battlefield, a mood of desperation could set in among senior decision-makers in the Kremlin. As soon as other options for escalation of hostilities by conventional means are exhausted, Moscow may resort to nuclear weapons and, in particular, the use of its tactical component to prevent a catastrophic defeat.
Thirdly, Russian strategists have long emphasized the utility of tactical nuclear weapons to achieve operational and tactical goals in the context of a conventional military conflict that Moscow would lose. And Russia has the capabilities to implement this concept: its tactical nuclear delivery systems include artillery, short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, all of which could be used in Ukraine. Russian strategists also envisage the preemptive use of tactical nuclear weapons not only against military, but also against civilian objects — cities, military-industrial centers and state objects, at least in the event of a war with NATO. Moscow can also use tactical weapons for demonstrative strikes either in the atmosphere or behind populated areas. The military effectiveness of using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine may be debatable, but this is a very likely circumstance given what is known about Russia's planning and capabilities. However, although the use of nuclear weapons by Russia in this conflict is likely, we cannot accurately determine the degree of this probability. What we can say for sure is that the risk of using nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian conflict is much higher than in peacetime. We can also fully assert that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would have very serious consequences for the United States. The US has made it clear publicly, and reportedly in direct contact with the Kremlin, that it will retaliate if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine. US officials have avoided specifying the nature of a possible response - instead using phrases such as "catastrophic consequences" - but one NATO official said it would "almost certainly" trigger a "physical response from many allies". Although this wording does not directly imply a military response, even a non-military retaliatory strike with "catastrophic consequences" for Russia could lead to an "eye for an eye" spiral leading to war between NATO and Russia. Thus, Russia's use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine could lead to a direct conflict between the US and Russia, which could eventually lead to an exchange of strategic nuclear strikes. But even if it were possible to deal with the problems of Russia's use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine itself, it would have very serious consequences for the United States. If Russia gains any concessions or achieves military success through the use of nuclear weapons, the global non-use norms will be weakened and other countries will be more likely to use such weapons in future conflicts. Moreover, Russia's use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would have large and unforeseeable consequences for the Allies' war policy, potentially leading to the breakdown of transatlantic unity. The death and destruction in Ukraine could also have a serious impact on the public of the US and its allies.
The Ukrainian conflict may turn into a Russia-NATO conflict.
It is reported that as of October 2021, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley first briefed President Joe Biden on Russia's plans to invade Ukraine, Milley already had a list of "American interests and strategic objectives" in the Ukraine crisis.
Under number 1 in the section "Can't" was: "It is impossible to allow a conventional military conflict between the armed forces of the United States and NATO with Russia". The second point, closely related to the first, said: "This conflict cannot be released from the geographical borders of Ukraine". Today, Russia and Ukraine remain the only participants in the military conflict. But he can still attract US allies. The fighting is taking place in a country that borders four NATO member states on land and shares the Black Sea coast with two others.
The scale of indirect participation of NATO allies in the war is literally breathtaking. The support includes tens of billions of dollars worth of arms and other aid to Ukraine, tactical intelligence, surveillance and intelligence support for the Armed Forces, billions of dollars a month in direct budget support for Kyiv, and painful economic sanctions against Russia. A previous report by the RAND Corporation outlined four possible reasons for Russia's deliberate decision to strike NATO member states in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. Among them are:
- In order to punish NATO members for the policies that are already being carried out and to facilitate the termination of allied support to Ukraine.
- A pre-emptive strike on NATO, if Russia considers that NATO intervention in Ukraine is inevitable.
- To prevent the transfer to Ukraine of such weapons that, in Russia's opinion, could lead to its defeat.
- To take revenge on NATO for possible support of internal unrest in Russia.
While a Russian decision to attack a NATO member state is by no means inevitable, in part because it could lead to war with the all-powerful alliance, the risk increases as long as the conflict in Ukraine continues. Moreover, an unintended escalation leading to NATO's entry into the conflict is also a constant risk. Although the November 2022 incident involving the downing of a Ukrainian air defense missile on Polish territory did not get out of hand, it demonstrated that hostilities can inadvertently spill over into the territory of US allies neighboring Ukraine. In the future, a guidance error could lead to a Russian missile landing in NATO territory, potentially triggering an action-reaction cycle that could lead to full-scale conflict.
If the military conflict in Ukraine ends, the likelihood of a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO, whether intentional or unintentional, will obviously decrease significantly.
It's understandable why Milley called preventing a war between Russia and NATO a top US priority: otherwise the US military would immediately be drawn into a conflict with the country that has the world's largest nuclear arsenal. And keeping a war between Russia and NATO below the nuclear threshold will be extremely difficult, especially given the weakened state of Russia's conventional armed forces. Some analysts doubt that Russia will attack the NATO country, since it is already surrendering to Ukrainian forces and will find itself at war with the world's most powerful alliance. However, if the Kremlin concludes that the country's national security is seriously threatened, it may well deliberately escalate the conflict for lack of better alternatives.
Control over Ukrainian territory.
As of December 2022, Russia controlled almost 20% of the territory of Ukraine. Kyiv's primary task is to restore control over this territory. And Ukraine has achieved certain successes, especially in Kharkiv and Kherson. However, the areas still controlled by Russia contain the most important economic assets, such as the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, which provided up to 20% of Ukraine's pre-war energy capacity, and the entire Ukrainian coast of the Sea of Azov.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy strongly advocates a military campaign to liberate the entire internationally recognized territory of Ukraine. And he justifies this goal with the moral imperative of liberating the citizens of his country from the brutal Russian occupation. Such a development of the Ukrainian conflict, which would allow Ukraine to return under its control as much of its internationally recognized territory as possible, would be beneficial for the United States. The US is interested in strengthening the norm of territorial integrity enshrined in international law. However, the consequences of further expansion of Ukrainian territorial control beyond the December 2022 line are unclear. Even if Ukraine took control of all the territory that Russia seized from February 24, 2022, the territorial integrity of Ukraine would still be violated by Moscow. In other words, it is not yet clear whether the development of the conflict, which involves Russia maintaining the December 2022 line of control, will cause more damage to the international order than the option where Russian forces would be pushed back to the February 2022 line. After all, in both cases, Russia will, as before, control part of the territory of Ukraine, violating the norm of territorial integrity.
Only such an outcome of the conflict, which leaves Ukraine in full control over its entire internationally recognized territory, will restore the norm of territorial integrity. But this outcome remains a very unlikely option. In addition, the weakening of the norm of territorial integrity does not depend so much on the number of illegally seized lands, as it is a consequence of the recognition of the relevant territorial changes by the international community. The United States should not (and almost certainly will not) officially recognize any Russian occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory regardless of where the de facto line of control lies.
As in the case of Crimea, the United States could take steps to make Russian conquests after February 24, 2022 illegal, and make Russia pay a heavy price for its special operation. The degree of Kyiv's control over its territory may affect Ukraine's long-term economic viability and, therefore, US aid needs. For example, if Moscow seizes the entire Ukrainian Black Sea coast, leaving Ukraine landlocked, this will create serious long-term economic problems for the country. However, such an outcome seems unlikely, given Russia's military actions to date. The economic consequences of Russia's possible long-term control of the territories by December 2022 compared to what it held until February 23, 2022, although difficult to calculate precisely, are likely to be much less severe for Ukraine. The economic effect of any lost territory will depend on the productivity of these territories and the degree of their interconnection with the rest of Ukraine. Be that as it may, Ukraine's economy will eventually adapt to any line. The question is how painful this adjustment will be. Furthermore, given Russia's ability to strike far beyond the current Line of Control (or any Line of Control), Ukraine's greater control over its territories is not directly associated with greater economic benefits or, for that matter, greater security.
After all, although since September, Kyiv has regained significant territory, Russia has caused greater economic damage to Ukraine by carrying out attacks on its most important infrastructure. The lingering threat of Russian attacks may discourage investment, and thus expanding Ukrainian territorial control is now important to the United States for humanitarian reasons, to strengthen international norms, and to promote Ukraine's future economic growth. However, the significance of the last two factors is debatable. Russia's violations of international norms occurred long before the current conflict and are likely to continue after the end of hostilities. The United States and its allies have already imposed many different kinds of sanctions and restrictions on Russia — spending that has already sent a signal to others. And the line of control as of December 2022 does not deprive Kyiv of economically important territories, the loss of which would negatively affect the viability of the country.
In addition to this, extending Ukraine's territorial control over its lost lands also carries potential costs and risks for the United States. First, given the sharp slowdown in the pace of counteroffensives by the Armed Forces in December 2022, restoring the Line of Control by February 2022—not to mention the territorial status quo by 2014—will take months and possibly years. Russia built powerful defensive fortifications along the front line, and its military mobilization eliminated the shortage of manpower that only allowed Ukraine to succeed in the Kharkiv counteroffensive. Prolonged and bloody hostilities are likely to be needed to give Kyiv the time it needs to regain control over much more of its territory. However, as we will show in the next section, a prolonged war can be costly for the United States.
In addition, if Ukraine crosses the line of control that existed until February 2022 and manages to regain territories such as Crimea, the risks of escalation — either the use of nuclear weapons or an attack on NATO — will become immeasurably high. The Kremlin is likely to view the possible loss of Crimea as a serious threat to national security and regime stability, given its military and economic assets stationed there and political capital invested in the development of the peninsula.
The duration of the military conflict in Ukraine.
We do not know how long this conflict will last. Some speculate that it could end with negotiations in the winter of 2023. Others say it will last for years. Many in the United States are reluctant to push for an end to the conflict at a time when Ukraine is gaining momentum on the battlefield and the Ukrainian people appear willing to bear the costs of a protracted conflict to achieve their goal. In addition, a longer conflict may allow the Ukrainian army to regain more territory, and the duration of the conflict has other positive consequences for US interests. A protracted conflict, cynical as it may sound, has some potential benefits for the United States. As long as the Ukrainian conflict continues, the Russian armed forces will, as before, be occupied in Ukraine and thus unable to threaten others. Longer hostilities will further weaken the Russian armed forces and weaken the Russian economy.
The Ukrainian conflict has already become so destructive for Russian power that its further gradual weakening may no longer be as important to US interests as it was in the early stages of the conflict. The Russian military and economy will need years, if not decades, to recover from the damage already done.
A protracted conflict would also put pressure on European governments to continue to reduce their energy dependence on Russia and spend more on their defense, possibly reducing the US defense burden in Europe in the long run.
However, the long military conflict in Ukraine also has significant disadvantages from the point of view of US interests. Longer military actions will lead to new human casualties, mass displacements and suffering of civilians of Ukraine. The ongoing conflict also leaves open the possibility that Russia will reverse Ukraine's battlefield gains in the fall of 2022. Mobilization in Russia could stabilize the position as of December 2022 and allow Russia to launch an offensive in 2023. The intensity of the West's and the USA's efforts to provide Ukraine with military aid may be called into question after some time. It is reported that stocks of many types of weapons in Europe and the USA are already running out. Thus, there are reasons to doubt that a longer military conflict will lead to further successes for Ukraine.
The cost to the United States and the European Union to maintain the economic solvency of the Ukrainian state will increase over time as the conflict holds back investment and production. Ukrainian refugees are still unable to return to the country and, as a result, tax revenues and economic activity in the country are falling to much lower levels than before the conflict. Russia's campaign to destroy Ukraine's vital infrastructure creates serious long-term problems for its continued military operations and economic recovery. It also significantly increased Kyiv's need for permanent economic support.
As long as the Ukrainian conflict continues, the global economic shocks caused by it will continue and probably even intensify. The start of the conflict caused a sharp rise in energy prices, which, in turn, contributed to inflation and a slowdown in economic growth around the world. These trends are expected to hit Europe the hardest. Rising energy prices alone could lead to more deaths of almost 150 people in Europe in the winter of 2022-2023. (4,8% higher than the statistical average).
The conflict has also contributed to worsening food insecurity around the world.
Ukraine's grain and oilseed exports fell by 50-70% of pre-war levels between March and November 2022, partly due to the Russian naval blockade and attacks on energy infrastructure. Russia has also limited its own export of fertilizers, of which it is the largest producer in the world. The result has been a significant global increase in food and fertilizer prices. Although food prices eased slightly after Russia agreed to allow Ukrainian grain exports from some Black Sea ports in July 2022, they remained above pre-war levels as of December 2022. These effects came at a time when food insecurity was already exacerbated by extreme weather, the COVID-19 pandemic and other global shocks.
In addition to economic consequences for Ukraine, Europe and the whole world, the protracted Ukrainian conflict will also have consequences for US foreign policy. The ability of the United States to focus on its other global priorities — particularly its rivalry with China — will remain limited. Bilateral or multilateral engagement — let alone cooperation — with Russia on key US interests is becoming extremely unlikely. For example, as long as the Ukrainian conflict continues, the prospects for negotiations regarding the extension of the new SNO treaty on strategic arms control, which expires in February 2026, will remain extremely unclear. On a global scale, high tensions persisting in relations with Russia will continue to harm the work of world institutions, such as the UN Security Council, and limit the possibilities of collective responses to common challenges.
Russia's deepening military cooperation with Iran — at a time when Iran is reneging on its commitments to curb its nuclear program — suggests that Moscow will be able to play a more active negative role on issues such as nuclear non-proliferation. And while Russia will become more dependent on China regardless of when the Ukrainian conflict ends, Washington has a long-term interest in ensuring that Moscow does not fall under Beijing's complete subjugation.
A longer conflict that increases Russia's dependence on China could give Beijing advantages in its competition with the United States.
Finally, the duration of hostilities is directly related to the two previously discussed cases of escalation (the possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia and the possible escalation of the conflict between Russia and NATO). As long as the Ukrainian conflict continues, the risk of both forms of escalation will remain high. When the conflict in Ukraine ends, these risks will decrease dramatically. Therefore, the interest of the United States in minimizing the risks of its escalation should strengthen the interest of the United States to avoid a protracted conflict. In short, nnegative consequences of the protracted Ukrainian conflict — from constant increased risks of escalation to economic damage far outweigh possible benefits.
The form of termination of the conflict.
Numerous publications about the end of the conflict in Ukraine offer three possible options for its end: absolute victory, armistice and political settlement. In this analysis, we do not consider operational pauses, temporary cease-fires, and agreements that did not take place.
Our focus is on the form in which the Ukrainian conflict may ultimately end, not on the ebb and flow of that outcome.
Absolute victory
One of the forms of ending the conflict is absolute victory. This result assumes that one state will "permanently eliminate the (interstate) threat that originates from its adversary." An absolute victory, as Dan Reuter points out, can be achieved by "the victor installing a new leadership in the defeated state, occupying or annexing the opponent's territory, or, in the worst case, exterminating the entire population of the opponent." While absolute victory may result in some form of agreement between the parties, its defining feature is "such an outcome of war as to make it essentially impossible for the defeated state to withdraw from an agreement to cease hostilities." Such victories were won by the Allies over Japan and Germany at the end of World War II.
When Moscow began its special military operation, it seemed that it sought absolute victory, planning to establish a new regime in Kyiv and "demilitarize" the country. By abandoning an attempt to seize the capital in early April, Russia appears to have disrupted those plans. Since then, Putin's stated goals have changed over time, but neither he nor his ministers have in recent months repeated the direct calls for the overthrow of the government in Kyiv made in the first weeks of the conflict.
Although some analysts argue that Moscow has not abandoned its original ambitious goals, even if the Kremlin still sought to impose an absolute victory on Kyiv, the facts show that it cannot do so now. At the time of writing, Moscow's primary goal appears to have been to hold territory in the four Ukrainian regions that Russia now claims as its own. But even if Russia were to keep these regions, it would hardly be its absolute victory.
To achieve this goal, Moscow needs to make fundamental changes in the political system of Ukraine, for example, overthrow President Zelensky. But the Ukrainian system of government now seems even stronger than before the conflict. Russia's brutal tactics pushed even those Ukrainians who had pro-Russian sympathies away from it, and Zelenskyi has enormous popularity among the people. Moreover, the Armed Forces with their current capabilities can indefinitely threaten the territories occupied by Russia or even the border regions of the Russian territory itself.
But the absolute victory of Ukraine is also unlikely.
Ukraine has never officially declared its intention to achieve an absolute victory, as it is defined in the military literature. President Zelenskyi's stated goals have subsequently changed, but as of December 2022, his main goal is to regain the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea and the Donbas regions. However, even the complete reconquest of their territory by the Ukrainians will not mean an absolute victory. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine were to dislodge Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine, they would undoubtedly seriously weaken the Russian army. Nevertheless, Russia will have a wide range of forces and assets on its territory and beyond - in particular, a navy and aerospace forces that have not suffered serious losses in the conflict, and will allow it to continue to strike targets deep in Ukraine. Russian ground forces can easily regroup and launch a new large-scale offensive.
In order to win an absolute victory, Ukraine must deprive Russia of the opportunity to deny the territorial integrity of Ukraine at all. Forcing the Russian army to cross the internationally recognized borders between the two countries towards Russia will not lead to such a result. And although Ukraine has surprised observers with its ability to defend its homeland, it is absurd to imagine that it can destroy the military potential of Russia. Therefore, Kyiv will probably need not only a victory on the battlefield, but also regime change in Moscow.
Some analysts argue that Russia's failures in Ukraine, mounting casualties and mobilization could cause political instability and lead to the ousting of Putin and his replacement by a new regime that would cease hostilities, come to an agreement with Ukraine and pose less of a threat to it in the long term. However, there is little historical evidence that failures on the battlefields in Russia will necessarily lead to a change in the ruling regime. The leaders of such "personalized" regimes as the Russian one often remained in power even after military defeats (the Russo-Japanese War).
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the new Russian leader will be more inclined to peace with Ukraine than Putin. As Sean Cochran writes, “it is difficult and probably foolish to predict any change of leadership in Russia in connection with the conflict in Ukraine. However, at a minimum, the West should not assume that a change in leadership in Moscow will end this conflict, at least in the short term, as Putin's special military operation may well continue without Putin."
Moreover, regime change in Moscow may not reduce the intensity of rivalry between the US and Russia on other issues. Despite this, Kyiv has not declared regime change in Moscow as its stated goal, although some Ukrainians, for obvious reasons, hope for it. Since neither side appears to have the intention or capacity to achieve an outright victory, the conflict is likely to end in some negotiated outcome. Negotiated endings to wars, as opposed to outright victories, require warring parties to accept some risk that the terms of peace may be violated. After all, even a "relative loss" in the conflict will retain the opportunity to threaten the other party. Agreements on the cessation of wars largely depends on the specifics of a specific conflict,
Armistice agreements
In armistice agreements, such as those that ended the Korean War in 1953 and the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova in 1992, both sides commit to an end to hostilities and often establish mechanisms, such as demilitarized zones, to prevent a resumption violence Although armistice agreements can be quite detailed (the Korean agreement took up almost 40 pages), they usually do not touch on the political factors of the conflict. This means that tensions can persist, and diplomatic and economic relations between the parties often remain at a minimum. Ceasefire agreements that include monitoring mechanisms and measures to reduce the risk of renewed conflict are more durable than those that do not.
A ceasefire in Ukraine will freeze the front lines and put an end to active hostilities for a long time. Russia will stop trying to win back additional Ukrainian territory and stop missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Ukrainian forces will stop their counteroffensives — strikes on the Russian occupied territories of Ukraine and on Russia itself. As before, there will still be unresolved territorial disputes between Kyiv and Moscow (that is, differences in positions regarding the location of Ukraine's borders), but they will be discussed in the political and economic, not the military, sphere.
Key political issues beyond territorial control, from Russia's payment of reparations to Ukraine's geopolitical status, will be ignored. The two sides are likely to conduct minimal trade, and the borders between them will be largely closed. The Line of Control is likely to become heavily militarized like Germany's internal border during the Cold War.
Political settlement
A political settlement or peace treaty would involve both a complete ceasefire and a resolution of at least some of the disputes that sparked the war or arose during it. Since 1946, peace treaties have been less common than armistice agreements, but they have tended to provide a stronger end to hostilities and a reduction in tensions.
In the case of a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a settlement would involve compromises on some key political issues important to both sides. Bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in the first weeks of the war, culminating in the Istanbul Communiqué published at the end of March, and later statements by political leaders hint at some of the issues that may encompass a political settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
For Russia, this is a clear definition of the status of Ukraine, which does not join NATO. For its part, Ukraine would like the West to strengthen its commitments to its security, as it does not trust Russia to honor any agreements. The settlement could cover a host of other issues, such as a recovery fund, bilateral trade, culture and freedom of movement, as well as the terms for the lifting of Western sanctions on Russia. A political settlement does not necessarily have to cover all these issues. It can solve other issues. But its main result will be the return to a certain extent of normal relations between the former warring parties.
It is important to note that the parties may or may not agree on the status of certain territories even while reaching agreements on other issues. For example, the Soviet Union and Japan normalized diplomatic and trade relations in 1956, but the territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo was never resolved. A political settlement is not designed to finally resolve all disputes between the parties. It needs only to resolve enough of these differences to qualitatively improve the broader relationship between the former belligerents.
These two forms of an agreed cessation of hostilities — armistice and political settlement — are practically not clearly demarcated. Many ceasefire agreements deal with some political issues, and some political settlements have been noted to leave key political disputes unresolved. A negotiated end to the conflict in Ukraine is likely to fall somewhere between these two ideals.
Implications for US interests
Since the absolute victory of any of the parties in the Ukrainian conflict is unlikely, most likely, at some point it will be stopped through negotiations. But given current trends, the prospects for such an agreement in the near future are slim, as we will show in the following sections. A political settlement may be more difficult to achieve than a cease-fire agreement, as the latter would be narrowly focused on maintaining a ceasefire rather than resolving a wide range of disputed issues between Ukraine and Russia.
The limited evidence available suggests that political settlements are more durable than armistice agreements. The logic of this is clear even on an intuitive level. A political settlement deals with the fundamental differences of both sides and the main issues of dispute between them. It leaves fewer problems to fight over in the future and creates the benefits of peace for both warring parties.
In the case of a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a settlement could also open the door to broader negotiations on "rules of the road" for regional stability that would mitigate the prospect of conflict elsewhere on Russia's periphery.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, US interests are better served by a political settlement that can lead to a more stable world than a cease-fire. In addition, a political settlement could be the first step towards solving broader regional problems and reducing the likelihood of a crisis between Russia and NATO in the future. If the intensity of competition in Europe is more manageable and the risk of renewed military conflict in Ukraine is lower, the United States will be able to reallocate resources according to its strategic priorities, and Ukraine will be able to recover economically with less external support.
However, the level of hostility as of December 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, and between Russia and the West, makes a political settlement far less likely than a ceasefire.
Summary
At this stage of the conflict, various variations are possible from all the above five aspects: the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, the escalation of relations between NATO and Russia, territorial control, the duration and form of ending the military phase of the conflict.
In the next section, we will consider how the United States should prioritize these aspects in shaping its policy regarding the Ukrainian conflict.
Determining the priority of conflict development options
For the United States, the two escalation factors described above — Russia's use of nuclear weapons and the conflict between Russia and NATO — are undoubtedly the most important in determining possible future options for the development of the Ukrainian conflict. Few in Washington would dispute that statement.
However, there is lively debate about the likelihood that any of these forms of escalation will actually occur. As we have already noted, although the probability of such a development of events is small, both options are still likely due to the circumstances created by the military conflict. Our analysis shows that the duration of the Ukrainian conflict is the most important of its parameters for the United States.
The negative consequences of a prolonged military conflict in Ukraine would be very serious for the United States. As long as the military phase of the conflict continues, the risks of escalation will remain elevated in any case. Therefore, the duration of the Ukrainian conflict and the risks of its escalation are directly related. In addition, longer military actions on the territory of Ukraine will continue to cause economic damage to Ukraine, as well as to Europe and the world economy. For the United States, a longer conflict will cause both an increase in direct costs (such as an increase in budgetary and military support to Ukraine) and an increase in opportunity costs in terms of the implementation of other foreign policy priorities.
As long as military actions are taking place in Ukraine, more and more Ukrainians will suffer, and the upward pressure on food and energy prices in the world will continue. Possible positive points from the prolongation of the conflict: further weakening of Russia and the opportunity for Ukraine to obtain territorial possessions. But the first no longer has a significant benefit: Russia is already significantly weakened. And territorial acquisitions for Ukraine are now not entirely certain: the longer the conflict continues, the more it can create opportunities for Russia to achieve success.
Expanding Ukrainian control over its territories would generally be beneficial to the United States, but only for humanitarian reasons - from the point of view of demonstrating the benefits of freeing more Ukrainians from the horrors of Russian occupation. But as for the support of the current world order and economic aspects, the arguments in favor of Ukraine's further expansion of the territories under its control are less clear. After all, Moscow has violated international norms of compliance with the territorial integrity of states since the return of Crimea and entry into eastern Ukraine in 2014. Even Russia's retreat to the lines of the status quo, which existed until February 2022, would not mitigate these violations. But the United States has the tools to increase Russia's spending on them and to strip Russia's illegal occupation of international legitimacy.
In addition, denying Moscow's territorial acquisitions will help send a signal to the world that similar acts will lead to an equally powerful rebuff. The expansion of Ukrainian territorial control could, in principle, bring economic production assets back under Kyiv's control, reducing Ukraine's dependence on the United States and its allies. However, given where the Line of Control was as of December 2022, this economic benefit is unlikely to be significant for Ukraine's viability.
If Russia were to advance much further west, and especially if it took control of the entire Black Sea coast of Ukraine, the economic consequences would likely be much more serious.
However, if Ukraine defeats the Russian army and regains all its territory, including Crimea, the risk of nuclear weapons or war between Russia and NATO will increase. Such an outcome is also unlikely at the current stage of the conflict. Our analysis shows that in this case two forms of ending the conflict are possible.
Since territorial gains alone will not end the war, and absolute victory for either side is unlikely, the importance of this aspect depends on how much the United States will benefit from a political settlement compared to an armistice agreement.
A political settlement may prove more durable than an armistice because it may create greater stability in Europe and allow the United States to free up resources for other priorities. Achieving such a settlement would be important, but a durable armistice would be beneficial to US interests. Moreover, a political settlement seems less likely, at least at this stage of the conflict.
Because preventing a protracted military conflict in Ukraine is the highest priority for the United States in order to minimize the risks of escalation, the United States should take steps that make an end to the conflict more likely in the medium term. However, Washington alone cannot reduce this conflict. But since the conflict will most likely end in negotiations, efforts must be made to stimulate negotiations. And the United States could take steps to remove major obstacles to their launch. The next section identifies barriers that can be addressed through US policy.
Obstacles to ending the conflict
Leaving aside the question of the desirability of ending the Ukrainian conflict, is it even possible to end hostilities in Ukraine through negotiations?
As of December 2022, this seems unlikely in the near term. Russia and Ukraine have not been negotiating a settlement since May. There are many reasons for the parties' refusal to negotiate. For example, increasingly complex territorial disputes and internal political restrictions, which make it difficult to reach a compromise. For example, it may be difficult for Ukrainian society to compromise with a country that has committed a brutal attack and continues to hold Ukrainian territory, especially when the armed forces seem capable of further success.
United States policy cannot overcome such obstacles to negotiations. But the question for Washington is whether there are factors in the Ukrainian conflict that US policy could influence. While there are many factors driving the sides to continue fighting, we suggest two driving forces of resistance to negotiations that Washington could moderate.
The main takeaway is that in order to negotiate, both sides must believe they have more to gain from peace than from continued military conflict. Optimism about a future profitable course of war and pessimism about the benefits of peace hinder negotiations and force warring parties to continue hostilities.
Optimism of each of the parties regarding the course of the conflict
Research in international relations has found that wars become protracted when belligerents disagree about their prospects for victory. In peacetime, states cannot be certain of an adversary's military capabilities or willingness to fight and, therefore, its ability to win on the battlefield. Moreover, states have an incentive to exaggerate their power and determination to get what they want without having to go to war. Some scholars believe that wars solve this cognitive-informational problem because combat quickly reveals the true balance of power.
Once such information is clear to both sides, the weaker or less determined one should begin to feel more optimistic about what it can gain by continuing the war.
This theoretical expectation that in the course of a military conflict the parties will quickly come to an understanding of which side will prevail is based on the assumption that their military power is largely constant. When this assumption is correct, the results of the first engagements should be a reliable indicator of the balance of power and thus a guide to how the parties will behave in future engagements.
In theory, both sides should use this information to predict future events, and their expectations of how the war will develop should match. But when the strength of one of the sides fluctuates in the course of hostilities, or when its strength can change significantly over time, data on the results of past battles no longer provide such clarity.
For example, these factors probably contributed to the considerable duration of the First World War in Europe. The deadlock on the Western Front in 1917 meant that the belligerents, if they looked at the results on the battlefield, had to accept that their chances of victory were roughly equal. Instead, both sides appear to have been overly optimistic about their ability to win and continued to fight.
The British and French were reluctant to negotiate that winter in part because they hoped that the US entry into the war would lead to a stalemate.
Germany believed that with the cessation of hostilities on the Eastern Front after the signing of the peace treaty with Russia, redeployed German forces would make a breakthrough in the west. This mutual over-optimism may have been a factor that hindered negotiations in late 1917 and early 1918.
These factors may also play a role in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Ukraine's military capabilities are highly dependent on an unpredictable external factor: military aid from the West. None of the players mentioned above—not Russia, not Ukraine, not the West—anticipated the unprecedented level of Western military and intelligence assistance to Kyiv or the effect that assistance would have. No one knows how much Western aid will be provided to Ukraine in the coming months and years, and what effect it may have. If we talk about it in the categories of the problem of information, then it is not clear how strong Ukraine will be in the future.
Faced with this uncertainty, the two countries seem to have reached different conclusions about Ukraine's future strength. As a result, despite the long months of fighting, both Russia and Ukraine are optimistic about the future. Ukraine optimistically believes that the support of the West will continue to grow, and Ukrainian combat capabilities will improve.
Russia appears to believe that the United States and its allies will eventually stop supporting Ukraine, especially as their spending on the Ukrainian military conflict skyrockets. In particular, the Kremlin says that high energy prices caused by the ongoing conflict are putting pressure on the European economy and will create public support for cuts in aid to Ukraine.
As the former president and now deputy head of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev said, "America always abandons its friends and its best puppets. Sooner or later it will happen this time too." According to Moscow, as soon as Ukraine inevitably loses the western vector of its life path, it will lose the ability to defeat the Russian army.
In short, both sides believe that their relative strength, and thus their ability to defeat the enemy, will increase over time.
The centrality of Western aid to Ukraine's military actions and uncertainty about the future of this aid have led Moscow and Kyiv to different conclusions about who will eventually win. Thus, the conflict does not solve the information problem in the way that scientific literature requires. Both sides have reason to be optimistic about the possibility of obtaining benefits in the continuation of the military confrontation. Historically, such mutual optimism has made ending wars difficult.
Pessimism of each side about the benefits of peace
Pessimism about the durability and benefits of peace may also contribute to prolonging the Ukrainian conflict.
We draw attention to two sources of such pessimism:
1) the inability of both parties to reliably undertake the obligation to comply with the agreement
2) Russia's confidence that Western sanctions will remain even after the end of the conflict.
Such approaches, known academically as "agreement reliability problems," can force warring parties to continue hostilities even when they know victory for one of them is impossible.
The fear that peace will not last long
Pessimism about the durability of peace can be caused by the fear that the other side will not fulfill the obligations it has taken within the framework of agreements to end the conflict. Mistrust in itself should not prevent deals. Often the warring parties do not trust each other even after the conflict, but many wars end in negotiations.
A real obstacle to negotiations arises if at least one of the warring parties believes that the other
1) is a potential aggressor that may gain relative strength in the future and will violate any agreement as soon as its position improves, or
2) may have significantly different advantages in the future.
Such concerns, known as "serious commitment problems," could lead warring parties to continue hostilities.
Let's go back, for example, to the First World War. In addition to mutual optimism about continued hostilities, serious commitment problems also forced the warring parties to continue fighting despite the stalemate. Fears that after the war the power of Germany would increase as the lands acquired under the treaty with Russia were united, London and Paris doubted whether Berlin would support the agreement. Thus, Britain believed that it needed to achieve an absolute victory over Germany, rather than negotiate a cessation of hostilities.
In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the problem with the reliability of compliance with obligations is undoubtedly manifested. The Ukrainian leadership seems to believe that Russia is a predatory state that will abandon any ceasefire and attack again as soon as it rebuilds its armed forces. Ukraine may also fear that it could lose Western support during any pause in hostilities caused by a ceasefire or political settlement, which would allow the Russian armed forces to recover more substantially or faster than the armed forces. These concerns affect Kyiv's openness to negotiations, regardless of how much Ukrainian territory it controls. Even if Ukraine regains control over its entire internationally recognized territory.
Unreliable peace
The second real problem of commitments is that the possibility of changing Ukraine's preferences may cause Russia to be pessimistic about peace. Russia has long wanted Ukraine to remain outside NATO. Earlier in the conflict, Ukraine made it clear that it could agree to neutrality as part of the settlement. Russia will probably see a significant profit only from such a world in which Ukraine makes a reliable commitment not to join NATO.
But Russia has little faith in the fact that any promise of Ukraine's neutrality will be fulfilled. Moscow has already experienced serious "somersaults" in Ukraine's foreign policy and negatively assesses the ability of the Ukrainian elite to fulfill its promises in the long term. The Kremlin will therefore be concerned that any future Ukrainian government that may come to power could reverse any promise of neutrality made under the settlement and toe the line on an even more active push for NATO.
Another factor may also explain Russia's pessimism about the benefits of peace: the prospect of maintaining Western sanctions after and after the end of the conflict. The US and its allies have imposed unprecedentedly tough sanctions against Russia as punishment for its war in Ukraine. And so far, it is not at all clear whether the US and its partners are ready to participate in a multilateral negotiation process in which they would offer Russia a way to ease sanctions. This pessimism is reinforced by statements from some US officials that one of Washington's goals is to weaken Russia in the long term. Moscow has every reason to believe that Western sanctions are likely to remain in place even if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is resolved bilaterally with Kyiv, ending the military conflict.
US options for removing obstacles to negotiations
The previous section summarized three factors that increase the general reluctance of the parties to start negotiations on the cessation of hostilities:
mutual optimism about the future, resulting from an overestimation of one's relative strength;
mutual pessimism about peace stemming from serious commitment problems;
for Russia, there is also the lack of a clear path to easing sanctions.
These are not the only obstacles to negotiations. However, they are the ones the United States is most able to influence through its own policies. In this section, we describe the policy options and their trade-offs that are available to Washington.
We recognize that there are strategies or other international players, such as the European Union, that could make decisions to remove these obstacles.
For example, Russia and Ukraine could agree to bilateral measures, such as demilitarized zones, to allay fears of renewed conflict. The United States could encourage other states to pursue such policies. However, here we will focus on options that the United States could implement directly.
Clarifying the future in aid to Ukraine
A major source of uncertainty about the outlook is the relative lack of clarity regarding the future of US and its allies' military assistance to Ukraine, both arms and intelligence. Although the effectiveness of the Ukrainian armed forces is an important factor in their success, external military and other assistance from the West and the United States has undoubtedly been a key factor.
For example, the US and allied high-precision, long-range multiple-launch missile systems provided to Ukraine in the summer of 2022 caused severe disruptions in Russian military logistics and resupply.
Clarity about future military assistance for the US and its allies can be used to achieve two goals. First, if a clear long-term plan with credible delivery schedules and clear implications for Ukraine's military capabilities were adopted, it could force Russia to take a more restrained stance on the future of its military operation. The United States has already taken steps in this direction by launching the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and creating a component of the US European Command dedicated solely to assisting Ukraine.
But the supply of Western weapons to Ukraine has not yet become regular, and there is no transparent long-term plan for their implementation. Western aid, as before, is only a reaction to Russia's actions, and thus Ukraine's future military capabilities remain uncertain.
Second, the United States may decide to condition its future military aid to Ukraine on its agreement to negotiate. Conditionalizing Ukraine's aid would remove a major source of Kyiv's optimism that may contribute to the continuation of the conflict: the belief that Western aid will continue indefinitely or increase in quality and quantity. At the same time, the United States could also promise Ukraine more aid in the post-war period to allay Kyiv's fears about the durability of the peace.
Washington has done so on other occasions in the past, providing Israel with massive aid after it signed the Camp David Accords and a bilateral peace agreement with Egypt, ensuring that Israel's military capabilities would surpass those of its neighbors. Although this example differs in many ways from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, it suggests that the United States has ways to adjust its long-term aid commitments to convince its close partners of their ability to defend themselves.
Linking aid to Ukraine with its willingness to negotiate has so far been "anathema" in political discussions in the West, and there is a good reason for that: Ukraine is defending itself from Russia. However, US approaches may change as costs and risks rise. And the use of this American lever can be verified. For example, the United States could slightly reduce aid, but not cut it sharply, if Ukraine does not go to negotiations. Again, a decision to "level off" some support pending negotiations could be made in tandem with promises of a sustained post-war increase in aid over the long term.
Pledges to increase aid to Ukraine in order to reduce Russia's optimism about victory could prompt Ukrainians to obstruct negotiations, try to blame their failures on Moscow, and gain even more support from the West. And announcing a reduction or "equalization" of aid to Ukraine in order to reduce Kyiv's optimism about the conflict could lead to Russia seeing the move as a signal that the U.S. is loosening its support for Ukraine.
If Russia understood it this way, it could continue hostilities in the hope that the United States would completely abandon Ukraine.
The United States should monitor developments carefully and impartially and focus its efforts to achieve the desired effect on the side whose over-optimism is a key obstacle to the start of negotiations.
Obligations of the US and allies regarding the security of Ukraine
To address the issue of credible commitments for Ukraine, the United States and its allies could consider defining the long-term commitments they are willing to make to Ukraine's security if Kyiv comes to an agreement with Moscow.
Security commitments can take many forms, from promises of limited support in wartime to assurances of military intervention to protect another country in the event of an attack. Providing Kyiv with such a commitment could influence Ukraine's decision to cease hostilities: it would remove Kyiv's fears about the reliability of Moscow's promises not to attack Ukraine again as part of the settlement. A US security commitment—especially a commitment to intervene militarily in the event of another Russian attack—will keep Moscow in check as Russia risks a conflict with a much more powerful coalition, not just Ukraine. Ukraine will be more confident in its security and will have more stable conditions for economic recovery after the conflict.
In 2022, Kyiv proposed that the United States and other countries make commitments to Ukraine even tougher than those Washington has made to NATO allies: a direct promise to use military force if Ukraine is attacked again.
Even Article 5 of the Washington Treaty does not oblige NATO allies to use force in the event of an attack on another member of the alliance. Each ally promises only to take "such action as it deems necessary" in the event of an attack on an ally. The reaction of Western capitals to the proposed commitment was cool.
British Deputy Prime Minister Dominic Raab said: “We are not going to...the United States and key allies are prepared to commit to the level of support they are currently providing to Ukraine if it is attacked again. This support is extraordinary in its scale and scope, and Ukraine has used it more effectively than anyone could have imagined before the conflict. However, the promise to provide the same support again may not remove the problem of reliable commitments for Ukraine: no matter how effective it is, the current support of the West has not stopped Russia from continuing its special operation in Ukraine. Creative approaches could be considered that are not as binding as US mutual defense treaties, but more meaningful than simple promises to return to current levels of support in future contingencies.
While this may help sweeten the deal for Kyiv, US commitments to Ukraine's security may prove unacceptable to Moscow. After all, one of Russia's motives was to prevent Ukraine's rapprochement with the West. The creators of the Istanbul Communiqué envisioned overcoming this problem by securing Russia's consent to a multilateral agreement on security guarantees with the participation of Russia, the United States, and other countries named as guarantors.
The guarantee must be given on the understanding that Ukraine will remain neutral and will not join any of these states. The document also excludes the placement of foreign military personnel and conducting exercises on the territory of Ukraine. While Russia's support of US security commitments to Ukraine may seem illogical, in this case Moscow may be motivated by this firm condition of Ukraine's permanent neutrality and strict limits on foreign military presence on its territory.
Offering even limited US commitments to Ukraine's security could entail costs and risks for the United States. For example, if the United States were to devote significant resources to arming Ukraine in peacetime, it would have fewer resources for its other priorities. Moreover, in the event of another Russian-Ukrainian conflict, commitments to Ukraine limited the US's freedom of maneuver in developing a response.
Thus, it is necessary to carefully weigh the benefits of US security commitments—Ukraine's increased willingness to negotiate, possible cessation of hostilities, and future deterrence of Russia—against these potential drawbacks of our commitments.
Obligations of the US and allies regarding the neutrality of Ukraine
As noted earlier, the problem of credible commitments for Russia is related to the potential promise of Ukraine's neutrality made as part of a peace settlement. Moscow's perception that Ukraine's unilateral commitment is not credible could make peace much less attractive to Russia.
Under the Istanbul Communiqué, Russia would receive an international legal commitment to Ukraine's neutrality from the US and several NATO allies in addition to Ukraine's own commitment to neutrality. However, the fulfillment by the US and its allies of the condition regarding Ukraine's neutrality will create a serious additional obstacle, namely: the need to change Western policy or even legislation depending on the nature of the commitment regarding Ukraine's future accession to NATO.
The United States has so far adhered to its policy regarding the future of Ukraine in NATO, which existed before the military conflict. This is rhetorical support for Kyiv's desire to join the alliance and refusal to participate in negotiations that would somehow undermine NATO's open door policy. It is the principle that the Alliance will consider applications for membership only from countries that meet the relevant requirements and no others.
Since in the Istanbul Communiqué, Russia's acceptance of US or allied security commitments to Ukraine was tied to promises of its neutrality, Kyiv probably needs some additional security commitments to make this neutrality acceptable to itself.
By itself, multilateral commitment to Ukraine's neutrality will be perceived by Kyiv as a net negative for the country's security: the prospect of NATO membership will be removed from the discussion and will not be replaced by anything. Politically, any government in Kyiv needs to show something to the Ukrainian public as compensation for the "loss" of the opportunity to join NATO.
As with US security commitments, Washington's support for Ukraine's neutrality will necessitate trade-offs for the United States. On the one hand, it could contribute to the cessation of hostilities and the elimination of a long-standing source of tension between NATO and Russia.
But on the other hand, it would be too difficult for the USA politically both inside the country, and in relations with allies, and in working with Ukraine.
Indeed, an independent, sovereign decision by Kyiv to formalize its neutrality would be a necessary prerequisite for Washington to consider Ukraine's commitment to this status. And even then, some US allies may resist any hint of a change in NATO's open-door policy, especially one made under pressure from Russia.
In addition, a commitment to the security and neutrality of Ukraine would be a new construct for the United States: traditionally, firm security commitments are given only to allies. And if you try to make Ukraine safer without undermining its neutrality, then it is difficult to talk about maintaining the balance of interests of many players.
Creation of conditions for the lifting of sanctions from Russia
As already mentioned, part of Russia's pessimism about the world may be related to its confidence that international sanctions against it will remain in place even if it agrees to end hostilities in Ukraine. Thus, offering a path to partial sanctions relief is one step that could make peace talks more likely.
The United States, the European Union and other partners have imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia, including freezing more than $300 billion in Russian central bank assets and imposing export controls that will severely limit the country's future growth.
Until now, US sanctions have been mainly seen as a punishment for Russia's actions, rather than as a tool to influence Moscow's behavior and involve it in discussing world issues. As Daniel Drezner pointed out, the United States and its partners did not give a clear answer to the question "what Russia can do to lift the sanctions." "The lack of clarity on this issue undermines bargaining power because the sanctioned entity believes that it will remain in place no matter what it does."
Meanwhile, the promise of sanctions relief facilitated Iran's willingness to negotiate on its nuclear program and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015, as well as Libya's agreement to give up its weapons of mass destruction in 2003. Although these examples are not perfect analogies, they indicate the possibility of using the promise of a partial lifting of sanctions as part of a bargain aimed at providing beneficial influence on an adversary.
Some might argue that promising to lift sanctions would reward Russia and signal to China and other US adversaries that they could benefit from using force. However, this argument ignores the high price that Russia has already paid for this conflict: the damage to its economy, the damage to its international reputation, the weakening of its armed forces, the concerted efforts of Europe to stop the import of Russian hydrocarbons, the stimulation of further NATO expansion at the expense of Finland and Sweden, and the encouragement NATO's European allies to increase defense spending.
Some of these costs may be temporary for Russia. But some, such as NATO expansion, Europe's efforts to reduce energy dependence and economic losses, appear to be permanent changes. Given these significant costs of military action for Russia, it is unlikely that other states will view the Ukrainian conflict as clear evidence that aggression is paying off.
Even if, in the end, some sanctions will be lifted as part of the agreement on ending the military conflict. Moreover, the easing of sanctions is likely to be partial at best: some measures, such as much stricter export controls, are likely to be permanent in nature.
However, other risks should be considered. The United States has made significant efforts to build and maintain a global coalition to impose sanctions on Russia. It should be assumed that they will seek to win the support of the members of this coalition before signaling the possibility of lifting sanctions on Russia. But the US may not be able to get all its participants to agree, which could limit the amount of sanctions relief that Washington can offer. Even if the members of the coalition were to unite in a plan to weaken anti-Russian sanctions, there would be a risk: if they go to withdraw the sanctions as part of the negotiation process, some states may not want to put them back if the peace agreements between Ukraine and Russia collapse. The coalition may not be as strong and united as it is now, if it later needs to reimpose sanctions against Russia.
Moreover, US leaders may suffer politically in the face of both internal and external forces opposing any easing of sanctions.
Visnovok
In the debates in Washington and other Western capitals about the future of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, their participants prefer the issue of territorial control.
Democrats are in favor of increasing military aid to Ukraine in order to facilitate the recapture of all the country's territories by the Armed Forces. Their opponents are calling for the United States to accept the Line of Control by February 2022, citing the risks of an escalation of the conflict associated with attempts by the Ukrainian army to advance further.
Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated that the goal of US policy is to give Ukraine the opportunity to "take back the territory that has been seized from it since February 24, 2022."
Our analysis shows that this debate is too narrowly focused on only one of many dimensions of military conflict. Territorial control, while extremely important to Ukraine, is not the most important aspect of the conflict for the United States. We have concluded that, other than preventing a possible escalation between Russia and NATO or the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, preventing protracted military action is a more important priority for the United States than helping Ukraine expand its controlled territories.
Among other things, the US has very limited ability to control at the micro level where the contact lines between Ukrainian and Russian forces will ultimately pass, as the US military does not directly participate in hostilities. Helping Ukraine expand its controlled territories in its country is far from the only tool available to the United States to influence the course of the conflict.
In our work, we have identified several other potentially more powerful tools that Washington can use to direct military action in the direction that best serves US interests.
President Biden said that this conflict will end at the negotiating table. But the administration has so far taken no steps to push the parties into a negotiation process. While it is far from certain that a change in US policy can trigger negotiations, taking one or more of the initiatives described in this analysis could make them more likely. We found the reasons why Russia and Ukraine may have mutual excessive optimism about victory and pessimism about peace.
Authors: Samuel Charap (Samuel Charap) is a senior researcher at the research corporation RAND Corporation
Miranda Priebe is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation and director of the Center for the Study of US Foreign Policy Strategy
