The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhnyi gave a long interview to the publication The Economist, December 3 2022 year. He began with his personal view of the war.
Valery Zaluzhnyi: For us, for the military, the war began in 2014. For me personally in July 2014. And I had no idea what war was like in 2014.
I read many books, I graduated from all the academies with a gold medal, I understood everything theoretically, but I did not understand what war really was. But during the eight years of the war, by 2022, both I and those like me understood all this perfectly.
All we did when the large-scale aggression began was to implement not only our knowledge that we already had in 2014, but also the skills and experience that we have gained since then. And the most important experience that we had and which we professed almost like a religion - Russians and any other enemies must be killed, simply killed, and the main thing is not to be afraid to do it. And that's what we do.
All that happened on February 24 was an increase in scale. Before that, we had a front of 403 km and 232 strongholds. And by February 24, this front increased to 2 km. And we were a relatively small force, but we went into battle. Naturally, we understood that we were not strong enough. Our task was to distribute our smaller forces in such a way as to use unconventional tactics to stop the advance.
The Economist: What distinguishes you as a commander?
VZ: The Soviet army welcomed and implemented one concept: the commander. But being a commander and being a leader are not the same thing. With all due respect to Mr. Surovikin [the commander of the Russian troops in Ukraine], if you look at him, he is an ordinary Petrovian commander of the Petrovian times, let's say a Derzhimord [a brutal marketeer in Gogol's "Revisor".
You look at him and realize that either you are doing the job or you are a cunt. And we realized a long time ago that it doesn't work. And we especially understood this in 2014, when a 21-year-old lieutenant came to command men who were 50-60 years old. Of course, we had our derjimords who tried to keep order with fists and biceps, but it doesn't work 100% in the Ukrainian army... You can always be normal. To be normal is to remain human in any situation, that is the most important thing. Remain human, become a leader. To be smarter, to be stronger, to be more talented and then try to lead people. This is the religion I practiced.
TE: Does that mean you listen to your officers and encourage their initiative?
VZ: I trust my generals. Since the beginning of the war, I have fired ten of them because they were not up to par. Another one shot himself. I trust Syrskyi [General Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine]. If he tells me he needs another brigade, then he really needs another brigade. I certainly don't think I'm the smartest one here. I have to listen and I listen to those who are on the ground. Because the initiative is there.
TE: Who is your role model in military affairs?
VZ: Turn your head to the left. There is a portrait of the late Gennady Petrovich Vorobyov [Commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine from 2009 to 2014]. He was a man who enjoyed great respect in the army. Why do I have him here? When I'm calm, when I'm fine, this photo is usually face down, I don't need to look at it. When I have doubts about something, I put it vertically. I turn around and look at her, trying to understand how Gennady Vorobyov would act in this situation. He is a successful person. This is a man who was not easy because he helped everyone. To everyone. He knew everyone in the Armed Forces, their wives, their children, their nephews and so on. It was difficult for him, but he took this heavy burden and carried it. Here is such an example.
TE: The photograph is currently vertical.
VZ: Yes, there are many doubts.
TE: What kind?
VZ: We have already realized through a number of operations that the main thing is not to be afraid of this enemy. It can be fought, it must be fought today, here and now. And in no case do not put it off until tomorrow, because there will be problems. To do this requires resources. Just like the Russians, when we plan something, we have to have the resources to do it. Then, if your position is right and you make the right decisions, you can count on the right result.
The Russians have been accumulating their resources for a long time. According to my calculations, for three and a half to four years they intensively increased them: people, equipment, ammunition. I think they had a three month supply of resources to accomplish their goals. The fact that they have exhausted these resources and squandered their potential without achieving almost any result shows that their position was wrongly chosen. Now they have to think again how to get out of this situation.
They wanted to take Kyiv. From a military point of view, it was the right decision - the easiest way to achieve its goal. I would do the same. I know Gerasimov [head of the Russian Armed Forces] well (not personally, of course). He had no other choice. He concentrated on Donbas to preserve the resources he had left. Today, the situation in Donbas is not easy. But strategically, this is a no-win situation for the Russian army.
So, most likely, they are looking for ways to stop [the hostilities] and get a pause in any way possible: by shelling civilians, by leaving our wives and children to freeze. They need it for one simple reason: they need time to gather resources and build new capacity so that they can continue to fulfill their goals.
But at the same time, they are working on another task, they are doing everything possible to prevent us from regrouping and striking on our own. That is why you see fighting along a 1500 kilometer front line. Some are more intense, some less intense, but they bind our troops to prevent us from regrouping. The fact that they are fighting fiercely now is, of course, very bad. But this is not a solution to the strategic problem. It simply exhausts the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Therefore, as during the Second World War, I have no doubt about it, most likely, somewhere beyond the Urals, new resources are being prepared. They prepare 100%.
Ammunition is being prepared, not very good, but still. These will not be the resources that could be in two years of armistice. They will be lousy and the fighting potential will be very, very low, even if they put a million more people into the army to fodder the cannon like Zhukov [a high-ranking Soviet military leader during World War II] did, it still won't the desired result.
Therefore, the next problem before us is, first of all, to hold this line and not lose any more ground. It is very important. Because I know that it is ten to fifteen times more difficult to release her than to fail. Therefore, our task now is to hold back. Our task is to very clearly monitor, with the help of our partners, what is happening there, where they are preparing. This is our strategic task.
Our second strategic task is to prepare for this war, which may begin in February. To be able to wage war with fresh forces and reserves. Our troops are now all tied up in battles, they are bleeding. They are bleeding and holding on only thanks to the courage, heroism and ability of the commanders to keep the situation under control.
The second, very important strategic task for us is the creation of reserves and preparation for the war, which may take place in February, in the best case in March, and in the worst case - at the end of January. It can start not in Donbas, but in the direction of Kyiv, from the Belarusian side, I do not rule out the southern direction as well.
Therefore, the next problem before us is, first of all, to hold this line and not lose any more ground. It is very important. Because I know that it is ten to fifteen times more difficult to release her than to fail. Therefore, our task now is to hold back. Our task is to very clearly monitor, with the help of our partners, what is happening there, where they are preparing. This is our strategic task.
Our second strategic task is to prepare for this war, which may begin in February. To be able to wage war with fresh forces and reserves. Our troops are now all tied up in battles, they are bleeding. They are bleeding and holding on only thanks to the courage, heroism and ability of the commanders to keep the situation under control.
The second, very important strategic task for us is the creation of reserves and preparation for the war, which may take place in February, in the best case in March, and in the worst case - at the end of January. It can start not in Donbas, but in the direction of Kyiv, from the Belarusian side, I do not rule out the southern direction as well.
We made all the calculations - how many tanks, artillery and so on, and so on, we need. This is what everyone needs to focus on right now. Forgive me the soldiers in the trenches, but now it's more important to focus on building up resources for the longer and harder battles that may begin next year. I'll be talking to Millie [America's Best Soldier] about it [later today].
I'll tell him what it's worth, how much it costs. If we don't get it, of course we will fight to the end. But, as one movie hero said, "I can't vouch for the consequences." The consequences are not difficult to predict. This is what we have to do.
There is also a third, very important task for us, a third strategic task, which, unfortunately, is connected with the first (maintenance of borders and positions) and the second (accumulation of resources). These are anti-missile defense and anti-aircraft defense. In my personal opinion, I'm not an energy expert, but it seems to me that we are on the brink. We are balancing on a fine line. And if [the power system] is destroyed... then soldiers' wives and children will begin to freeze. And such a scenario is possible. In what mood will the fighters be, can you imagine? Without water, light and heat, can we talk about preparing reserves to continue fighting?
TE: Is it necessary to carry out another wave of mobilization?
VZ: We are already holding it as it is. We have enough people and I can clearly see what I have. I have enough. I don't need hundreds of thousands more.
We need tanks, we need BMPs, armored personnel carriers. And we need ammunition. Mind you, I'm not talking about F-16 fighter jets right now.
TE: Have the Russian forces adapted to the Hymars [American-made multiple launch rocket systems]?
VZ: Yes. They have moved to a distance that the "Highmars" cannot reach. And we have nothing more long-range
TE: Can we talk about air defense?
VZ: We currently have a ratio of 0,76. The Russians use this efficiency factor of 0,76 when planning their attacks. This means that instead of 76 missiles, they launch 100. And 24 of them fly by and reach their target. And what are two rockets doing with a power plant? She will not work for two years. Therefore, it (the air defense system) must be expanded.
NATO specialists know everything, absolutely everything, down to the last detail. The calculations have been made, and thank God that everything has moved from place to place. We already have several Nasams [Norwegian-American air defense systems]. Not enough, but there is. "Iris-T" [German anti-aircraft missile system] is already in service. Not enough, but there is. They just need to be increased. We need dozens of such systems.
TE: Are your allies holding you back from attacking Crimea?
VZ: I can't answer the question whether they deter or not. I'm just stating the facts. In order to get to the borders of Crimea, we currently need to cover a distance of 84 km to Melitopol. By the way, this is enough for us, because Melitopol will give us full fire control of the land corridor, because from Melitopol we can already fire on the Crimean Isthmus, from the same "Khaimars" and so on. Why am I telling you this? Because this goes back to my earlier point about resources. I can calculate, based on the assigned task, what resource is needed to build combat capability.
We're talking about the scale of the First World War... That's what Anthony Radakin [Britain's Greatest Soldier] told me. When I told him that the British Army had fired a million shells in the First World War, I was told: “We will lose Europe. We won't have anything to live for if you fire so many shells.'' When they say, "You will get 50 shells," the people counting the money pass out. The biggest problem is that they don't really exist.
With these resources, I cannot do new major operations, although we are currently working on one. She is already on the way, but you do not see her yet. We use far fewer shells.
I know I can defeat this enemy. But I need resources. I need 300 tanks, 600-700 BMP, 500 howitzers. Then, I think, it is absolutely possible to reach the milestone on February 23. But I can't do that with two brigades. I get what I get, but it's less than I need. It is not yet time to address the Ukrainian soldiers as Mannerheim addressed the Finnish soldiers. We can and must liberate a much larger area.
TE: How do you assess the mobilization in Russia?
VZ: Russian mobilization worked. It is not true that their problems are so dire that these people will not fight. They will. The king tells them to go to fight, and they go to fight. I studied the history of the two Chechen wars - everything was the same. They may not be as well equipped, but they are still a problem for us. According to our estimates, they have a reserve of 1,2-1,5 million people... The Russians are training about 200 new soldiers. I have no doubts that they will go to Kyiv again.
