"The British and the French, together with the countries of Northern Europe, are already quietly preparing to send troops - both small elite units and logistical and support personnel - who can stay far from the front lines." — such a statement was made by the consultant of the US State Department, Edward Luttwak, in a column for the portal UnHerd.
Since the creation of NATO 75 years ago, especially in the sixties and seventies, there has been a grueling effort to get some additional benefits from nuclear weapons and somehow gain an edge for the new Western alliance.
So-called "tactical" nuclear weapons were created not more, but much less powerful, allegedly for the possibility of their use on the battlefield. Its proponents argued that they could provide firepower by carrying small nuclear warheads that replicated the effect of hundreds of howitzers.
But this illusion could not be preserved. Military planners realized that if U.S. commanders attempted to defend NATO territory by attacking invading Soviet forces with small "tactical" nuclear weapons, the Russians would use their own arsenal to destroy the defending Western forces.
The same is true of any attempt to replace conventional military power with nuclear weapons. And so it became clear that, while nuclear weapons are a useful deterrent, they can only be used to strike back at previous nuclear attacks—and never to achieve any kind of victory. Thus, in the 1970s, when the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in complex and highly publicized "Strategic Arms Limitation" negotiations, officials on both sides quickly agreed to quietly end the development, production, and deployment of new "tactical" nuclear weapons.
In the 1999 Kargil War, which involved multiple full-scale battles and thousands of casualties, neither side attempted to even vocally threaten a nuclear strike. And this is still relevant today. When Putin's loudest dog, Dmitry Medvedev, began barking about the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons after the failure of the initial Russian invasion in 2022, only the least competent journalists and docile Moscow echoed his warning. In the end, after several months of this nonsense, Putin came out and said: Russia will use nuclear weapons only when "the very existence of the state is threatened" - that is, a corresponding nuclear threat.
The situation in Ukraine has changed again, but the logic is the same. Instead of the frustrated Russians wallowing in their trenches, Ukraine's position now looks precarious. Kyiv presents this as a material issue and constantly asks the West for more and better weapons. However, although more guns and missiles could be sent, it is clear that Kiev is being forced to retreat step by step not because of a lack of firepower, but because of a lack of soldiers.
Until this week, conscription for military service in Ukraine began only at the age of 27, in contrast to the global norm of 18.
Now Zelensky has reduced this age to 25 years; but since many Ukrainians have been discharged from service, its total strength is less than 800. Ukraine is hampered by the age distribution of the population, where children and the elderly predominate over young men aged 000-19.
But its troop total is still far too small for a population that most estimates exceed 30 million, given that Israel can quickly raise an army of about 600 out of a population of roughly 000 million. This means that unless Putin decides to end the war, Ukrainian forces will be pushed back again and again, losing irreplaceable soldiers in the process.
Therefore, NATO countries will soon have to send their soldiers to Ukraine, or accept a catastrophic defeat.
Britain and France, along with the Scandinavian countries, are already quietly preparing to send in troops — both small elite units and logistics and support personnel — that can remain far from the front. The latter could play a significant role by releasing their Ukrainian colleagues for retraining for combat positions.
NATO units could also free up Ukrainians who are currently busy restoring and repairing damaged equipment and could take over the technical part of existing recruit training programs. These NATO soldiers may never see combat, but they don't need to in order to help Ukraine make the most of its own scarce manpower.
Crucially, as China moves ever closer to attacking Taiwan, the US cannot commit more troops than the approximately 40 already in Europe.
Thus, an important decision is expected for other NATO members, especially for the most populous: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. If Europe fails to provide sufficient troops, Russia will win on the battlefield, and even if diplomacy successfully intervenes to avoid total disaster, Russian military power will triumphantly return to Central Europe. At this point, Western European states will have to rebuild their armed forces, whether they want it or not, starting with the return of conscription.
Perhaps, under such circumstances, we may even witness an outbreak of nuclear nostalgia, foolishly reverting to the illusion that apocalyptic weapons might be sufficient to keep the peace.
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