Online Glavred There was a chat with Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military and political commentator for the Information Resistance group. Talking to readers, he told when a ceasefire in Ukraine is possible, and why it definitely shouldn't be expected until Easter, why the energy and maritime truce are beneficial exclusively to Russia, under what conditions the Ukrainian Armed Forces will launch a counteroffensive this year, which regions of Russia the Ukrainian Armed Forces are preparing surprises for, and why without Ukraine, Trump will lose China's economic war.
Kovalenko Oleksandr was born on December 15, 1981 in Odessa. Graduated from the Odessa Academy of Communications named after Popov. Since 2014, he has been actively involved in countering Russian aggression against Ukraine. Military-political commentator for the Information Resistance group. Leading expert of the Ukrainian Center for Security Studies. Ukrainian political and economic blogger under the nickname "Evil Odessan".
Transcript of a chat with Oleksandr Kovalenko.
Mike: The Trump administration hopes to reach a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine by April 20. How realistic and achievable do you think such a goal is? Under what conditions is it possible?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: I see no way to complete this task within the specified time frame. This is impossible for several reasons.
Pay attention to how the next stage of negotiations in Saudi Arabia, in Riyadh, went. The American and Russian delegations talked for more than 12 hours, but to no avail. No agreements were reached on any issue that would allow a press conference to be held following the conversation. In fact, the results were reported to the public in this format - they say, "we talked, and we talked well," and that's it, no announcements about the decisions made, next steps and plans, or a roadmap.
This is not even a failure, but the process that was expected: Russia disrupts the peace talks that Washington is trying to impose. After all, Donald Trump firmly believes that he can be a peacemaker and be able to calm Russia. But this is impossible, this will not happen.
Why? At least because of the situation in the combat zone, where as of today Russia has not fulfilled the tasks of operational and operational-tactical importance that were set for the Russian army for 2024. The enemy planned to completely cut off the Kurakhiv salient. Did the occupiers do it? No. Russia planned to capture Pokrovsk or at least start urban battles. Did the Russian troops do it? No, the conditions for this have not even been created, moreover, the line of contact there is stabilized, and the Defense Forces of Ukraine from time to time conduct counterattacks and return positions under their control. The Russians planned to occupy the Torets agglomeration and Chasovy Yar. Did this happen? No, fighting is ongoing there. They planned to open the Konstantinovsky direction. Is it open? No, this process has not even begun. The occupiers intended to resume hostilities in the Siversky direction, reach the right bank of the Oskil River while establishing full control over the left bank of the Oskil River, and also establish full control over the left bank of the Chorny Zherebets River. The Russian occupation forces were also unable to accomplish these tasks.
These were all plans for 2024. And they have not been implemented.
How can Moscow agree to a ceasefire under such conditions? At the same time, Russia is truly interested in a ceasefire in order to be able to restore its resources.
A stalemate has developed for the Russian Federation: it needs a truce to restore resources, mobilize as much human potential as possible, restore the mechanized component, so that with new forces in six months or a year it can begin a new wave of larger-scale hostilities in Ukraine, but it cannot agree to this truce because the listed tasks in the combat zone have not been completed.
There are several other problems for Russia that prevent it from agreeing to a ceasefire now: firstly, it is the Kursk region, where our buffer zone in the area of the M-07 highway continues to exist, and secondly, it is the strange and incomprehensible events in the Belgorod region. How can a ceasefire be arranged under such conditions? Therefore, no, Moscow will not agree to this now.
In my opinion, Donald Trump's administration is unrealistically assessing the events unfolding in the war zone in Ukraine, and moreover, it is not even trying to do so, but simply making pretentious statements about peace, peacemaking, and achieving a ceasefire, especially by a date like Easter. But achieving a ceasefire by such a date is generally unrealistic.
Editor-in-Chief: Please clarify whether you believe that a ceasefire cannot be achieved by April 20 or in the coming months in general?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: I don't think that the situation in the near future will be conducive to this ceasefire in any way. The nearest future is in the next six months. That is, the situation will definitely not be conducive to a ceasefire by June.
However, a truce will be quite possible in the second half of 2025. But it will not be long-term - it will be a short-term truce, again because it is disadvantageous for Russia given the positions it occupies.
If Russia agrees to a ceasefire, it will be solely in order to disrupt it using its "hybrid" methods, blame Ukraine for this, and thus discredit it in the eyes of the Trump administration.
I don't see any prospect of a long-term truce, that is, for several months or more. I also don't see any point in these peace talks, because the only way to resolve the issue of war with Russia and return all the territories is by force.
Trump is still wearing rose-colored glasses, because his environment during his second term is radically different from that of his first term. During his first presidential term, Trump was surrounded by “hawks,” and these were leaders who cooled and controlled all his phantasmagoric actions. Now Donald Trump is surrounded by “sixes,” not very smart, not very capable of thinking strategically, who praise him and only encourage him, saying that he is the greatest president of the United States, and suggest taking Franklin off the $100 bill and putting Trump’s image on it. Trump is fine with that, because he has an inflated ego and narcissism.
However, all this can work to our advantage. If a person with such an inflated ego and narcissism is offended, he will not just be offended, but will want revenge, and a harsh one at that. Therefore, the most important thing for us today is to make Trump take offense at Putin. Yes, Trump was presented with a portrait, and Putin supposedly prayed for Trump - these are all secondary things. For a person like Trump, it really is one step from love to hate. And our strategic task now is to catalyze hatred of Putin in Trump. And this is possible only if Putin frames him. Putin has repeatedly framed Trump and continues to do so.
Nana: Russia is apparently preparing a new offensive for late March-April. In your estimation, how powerful could this Russian offensive be, and what will be the main directions of their strike?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: Today, the Russian occupation forces cannot afford a large, long-term combined-arms offensive campaign. They can concentrate individual forces and assets exclusively in separate directions, in separate locations.
For example, the Russians are currently conducting, relatively speaking, active operations in the Velikomykhailiv direction - along the Mokry Yaly River in the Donetsk region, this is the former Vremiv direction and the Velyka Novoselka area. It is there that the occupiers are currently trying to expand the zone of control, but they are not succeeding. Moreover, there, along the contact line less than 20 km long, the forces and assets of the 5th combined-arms army, the 36th combined-arms army, as well as the 68th army corps are concentrated. According to military science, a contact line up to 20 km long is a front for a divisional operation, that is, in principle, a division should be able to cope there, but two combined-arms armies and an army corps are concentrated there at once. This is a demonstration of the potential of the Russian occupation forces.
In the Pokrovsko-Kurakhovskoye direction, three groups of troops are concentrated: "South", "Center" and "East", combined arms armies - the 2nd, 41st, 8th, 90th tank divisions, etc. The total number is about 100 thousand, even a little more. The result? Not only can they not hold the occupied positions, but they also lose them: near Peschane, Vodyan-2, etc. To put it mildly, this is not a commie for such a large group. And we are talking about a "major offensive"...
Yes, a Russian offensive is possible. They can concentrate a large number of forces and equipment in a separate area and launch more intensive offensive actions there. This can happen in the Zaporizhia region. Although we saw how the 58th combined arms army, using its resources, was unable to cut route 0812 and reach Maly Shcherbaki and Shcherbaki recently in the direction of Pyatikhatka - Stepovoe. The occupiers did not succeed, although a serious potential was concentrated to break through our defensive lines and occupy Stepovoe. The Russians reached the outskirts, got hit in the teeth and immediately rolled back.
So I will say this: Russian troops may try to demonstrate their ability to attack. It is important for them. I will explain using the example of Zaporizhzhia region why they started actions there. The reason is simple – to impress Donald Trump.
In the information space, Russia is trying to demonstrate that it is capable of attacking, can afford something more, even “to reach Kyiv” or “to capture Odessa”. There is a lot of nonsense about both Kyiv and Odessa, but the Russians integrate this into the information space, in particular through pocket journalists of Western media. This is how they declare that Russia’s goal is Odesa, access to Transnistria, and it will be achieved. But, encroaching on Odessa, Russian troops cannot even squeeze out the islands near Kherson. This is their real “power”! The Russian troops cannot even take control of a swamp!
The Russians integrate such informational pretexts so that new names appear in the Western press. In the Western press, names like Pokrovska, Chasovye Yar, etc. are heard. Sometimes, when talking to Western journalists, when I mention Belogorivka or the Siversky direction, they ask in surprise: "What is this, has something new started? A new offensive?". To this I answer them that no, Belogorivka has been holding the defense for more than two years, there is nothing new. But the Russians play on this very thing, throwing in new names that are unfamiliar to the Western audience. If Trump's special representative for Ukraine does not remember which regions were included in the Russian raped constitution as part of the Russian Federation, then what can we say about the others! When the rednecks hear that an offensive has begun in the Orekhovo direction, it will be something new for them.
Russia will try to play on this. And in the next few months, the Russians will try to promote the topic of the Dnipropetrovsk region. If the occupiers continue to try to advance on Pokrovsk, they will be forced to enter the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region, because this is necessary to form their right, that is, western, flank. But they will not enter with the aim of capturing Pavlohrad or the Dnipro. However, Russia will focus on the fact that they are trying to capture these cities, and this is their next goal, and for now they have entered the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region to resolve the issue with Pokrovsk.
In addition, the occupiers have still not been able to open the Konstantinovka direction, but I think that in the near future they will try to catalyze their actions there, using the 8th combined arms army, which they withdrew from the Pokrovsky direction and concentrated on Toretskoe, in the strip between Vozdvizhenka and Toretskoe. That is, they will try to cut off the ledge that has formed between Vozdvizhenka and Toretskoe, and reach Konstantinovka. And in the Western information space this will be presented as Russia's ability to move further, occupy new territory and open a new direction.
Glavred: Given that you are talking about both the state of the Russian army and its inability to fulfill the tasks set for 2024, it seems that the Russians will be able to impress Trump, but not in the way they want. And their offensive will not be able to demonstrate any significant successes or achievements. What will impress Trump then? An offensive on donkeys and Zhiguli? How will they impress Trump if there are no achievements?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: The Russians are now saving equipment, and in the first stages of the offensive they will use a mechanized column. But very quickly all this will come to naught, it will end, so then the Zhiguli, UAZs and so on will go again.
But the point is not how Russia will impress Trump. Trump, like any other president, receives intelligence information and briefings from various security agencies every morning. And judging by what Trump says, it seems that he does not use the data provided to him by US intelligence services, but rather the data provided to him by Russia Today. Otherwise, where did the talk about the encirclement of 2,5-3 Ukrainian servicemen in the Kursk region come from? This is Russian propaganda. And where is this encirclement? This is also evidenced by other statements by Trump’s representatives, in particular, that the Ukrainian regions that are currently temporarily partially occupied always wanted to be part of the Russian Federation and supposedly were part of it, and then it changed – Lenin apparently decided so. Similar things come from Russian propaganda.
Unfortunately, now we are dealing with people who, to put it mildly, do not have a very sharp mind. These are people with hypertrophied egos and narcissism. You need to be able to communicate with such people. A person who has such fullness of power as Trump has cannot be humiliated, but you cannot praise him too much either. You need to adapt to such conditions. Trump's statements, for example, about territorial concessions are not necessarily the end of the world, not Doomsday, because he is an unpredictable person: he does not always do what he says, and he does not always say what he wants to do. Trump is a casino man.
It was difficult to adjust to the new conditions not only for our diplomatic sector, which is accustomed to civilized classical diplomacy, but also for our society. Our people are quite straightforward and understand everything as they hear. They do not understand the multi-story structures hidden under the surface - they perceive everything that is on the surface. In my opinion, our society should not pay much attention to what Trump says. We should rely on those who communicate with Trump, and it is much more difficult for them to communicate with a person who is convinced that 2,5 thousand Ukrainian servicemen are surrounded in Kursk.
I'm sure Putin will still be able to impress Trump. We're not at the stage yet where Trump will go crazy because Putin, like a classic St. Petersburg gopnik, is constantly "throwing" him. Trump won't understand Putin's "throwing" very quickly, but he will.
Moreover, the processes that we are currently observing are damaging Trump's reputation, and he is losing points and the electorate. Moreover, not only Trump himself is losing the electorate, but also the Republicans in general. And the elections to the US Congress and Senate will take place much earlier than Donald Trump ceases to be the 47th President of the United States. So the Republican Party needs to think about the electorate and its support for the Republicans, and now Trump's actions are harming the Republican Party. Therefore, the activation of the "hawkish" wing will happen one way or another.
Joker: Can the Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces get a "second wind", or is our final withdrawal from there inevitable? What will be the consequences for us?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: The Kursk operation continues, but it is developing in a different format. When we started the Kursk operation, it was designed to tie down the enemy's forces and form a buffer zone. Now, when Trump took office as President of the United States, the conditions have developed such that it has become very difficult to hold a buffer zone several dozen kilometers deep into the territories of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it was inevitable to withdraw our troops from the depths closer to the border. After all, logistics and support for the forward units that were on the front line suffered.
However, the Kursk operation is not over – it continues and changes its format. Now this operation is aimed at restraining the enemy, but not on such a large scale as it was a few months ago.
Moreover, the Kursk operation may overlap with other scenarios, because, for example, something is happening in the Belgorod region. If we look at the relief and landscape features of the region from which the whining of the Z-military units is constantly being relayed, then all this is very interesting there, because it also looks like the formation of a buffer zone. If, of course, we believe what the Z-military units say, because there are no official messages from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine yet.
So the Kursk operation is not just "getting a second wind", but continuing its development in a different format. And Putin, by the way, spoke about this format when he noted the need to form a buffer zone on the border with Ukraine. So we are forming it on the border of Ukraine, but on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Pavlo K.: What are your predictions for the prospects of the operation in the Belgorod region? Will our Defense Forces be able to establish control over part of the Belgorod region, as was the case with the Kursk region?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: We don't need Belgorod, I can say that right away. No one will go to Belgorod. I think our goal is to form a buffer zone. Not 50-100 km deep into Russian territory, but so that we can provide logistics, so that our units are in such relief and landscape conditions of the area, so that there are natural obstacles and we can block the enemy's offensive actions, that is, so that the natural features play into our hands, and then we will reinforce them with artificial obstacles: fortifications, borders, etc.
So I think the main thing is a buffer zone that will protect the entire border strip. It is important to form such a zone not only in the Kursk and Belgorod regions, but also in the Bryansk region, and in the future also in the Rostov region. Now we will deal with this.
Gradually, these buffer zones will be combined with each other. I think a buffer zone 5-10 km deep will be enough for us to control the lines that are advantageous to us and at the same time not to repeat the situation as in the Kursk region, when we went 20-30 km deep, and it is not clear what to do with logistics, when artillery cannot reach, Russian FPV drones fly in, especially on fiber optics, and control the entire route. That is, now everything will be compact and effective.
Max: Could operations similar to Kursk and Belgorod take place in other regions of Russia this year? What surprises can the Armed Forces of Ukraine throw at the Russians in the coming months?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: For example, the same operation as in the Kursk region could begin in the Kaliningrad region.
Marina: Why did Russia start attacking Sumy with the zeal of a maniac? Could the Sumy region become a major theater of hostilities?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: A major theater of hostilities – no. But a center for terror – yes, in the near future it is quite possible. Although Sumy has never rested from Russian terror, as one of the large border cities, like Kharkiv. Although attacks on Kharkiv were carried out more often than on Sumy.
In general, Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Dnipro, and Odesa most often experience Russian terror.
For Russia, the main thing is terror, intimidation of the population. It has been engaged in this, is engaged in it and will continue to be engaged in it, because terror against the civilian population is a general concept of the doctrine of conducting any military operations since the times of the Soviet Union. That is, the Russians not only attack and fight the army of another state, but also fight with the population. This doctrine was developed back in the days of the USSR and was constantly used. For example, the Afghan war: tens of times more civilians were killed in Afghanistan than the Mujahideen. Other examples are Chechnya and Georgia. What started the five-day war in Georgia? From the killing of civilians, that is, intimidation. If the war in Georgia had dragged on, we would have seen much more war crimes. So the Russians will always adhere to this doctrine.
danylo_raven: How do you assess the state of the Russian army, what are its obvious problems? We have already heard about donkeys, camels, and Zhiguli on the battlefield, but what next, will they fight with spears, bows, and arrows?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: Of course, they will not fight like this. The state of the Russian army is the worst, it has never been in such decline. The state of the Russian army in 2022, 2023, 2024 cannot even be compared to its state in 2025.
If we analyze by category, then right now Russia has the worst situation with air defense - it is becoming less and less. In this category, the Russian army is going into the red every month, and Russia cannot fully compensate for it.
Russia also has serious problems with special equipment, which includes evacuation, armored repair and evacuation vehicles, etc. Russia also has big problems with multiple launch rocket systems - the situation with MLRS is simply catastrophic and critical, there is a shortage of them. Then there is an acute shortage of armored combat equipment, which includes main battle tanks and armored combat vehicles.
In addition, there are problems, but so far they are not of a critical nature, with barrel artillery. And the Russians are critically short of specialized armored motor transport, that is, armored vehicles - not combat armored vehicles for combat operations, but, for example, such vehicles for police missions. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we saw how the Russians drove Tigers, Lynxes, used Typhoon-K, Typhoon-U, etc. Now all this is not there at all, now these are very rare, even exclusive cars. Instead of them, the Russians use UAZs, Zhiguli, etc.
But, I emphasize, the biggest problems in Russia are with air defense systems, with special equipment and multiple launch rocket systems, as well as with armored vehicles. The Russian army has had, has had, and will have serious problems. Somehow, Russia will not be able to solve them, because its military-industrial complex is not able to fully compensate for the losses that the Russians suffer in the combat zone in Ukraine every month.
fargo: How and what will Russia fight in the second half of 2025 if a ceasefire does not occur and it does not receive the necessary respite?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: Combat operations will be carried out exclusively by the infantry component. In principle, this was expected. At the end of 2024, I wrote that Russia will fight exclusively with infantry. And we must prepare for this and focus on means of destroying infantry - both in defense, that is, the formation of hypertrophied anti-personnel barriers in the main and probable directions of advance of Russian troops, and the transition to means of destruction that will cause more damage to the enemy's infantry: battalion artillery, compact multiple launch rocket systems, cluster warheads, a large number of fragmentation elements in means of destruction, for example, FPV drones. And, of course, anti-personnel barriers are needed in defense, even barbed wire, which works perfectly.
It is incomprehensible to me why, in the fourth year of a full-scale war with Russia, Ukraine is still implementing the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines. We are limited in our ability to use anti-personnel mines. Despite the fact that Poland has nowhere to rush, it is already raising the issue of withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention. The same goes for the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). On the other hand, Ukraine has not even raised this issue at the legislative level, and it is a signatory and ratifier of the Ottawa Convention. Personally, I do not understand why we are not doing this.
Mark: What could bring down the Russian front? And are there any signs now that this will happen in 2025?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: This is quite possible this year. If we receive sufficient assistance from our partners. This very condition can become the main catalyst. We can already conduct systematic counterattacks, and they are taking place in many directions. This is the result of the exhaustion of the Russian occupiers during 2024. In 2024, we did not counterattack in the combat zone in Ukraine as we are doing now.
All of this confirms that the Russians are exhausted and cannot afford major offensives, and at some point they will not be able to afford defensive actions.
But all this will depend on the support of our partners, so help from the US is important. Without American help we can cope, without the US we can hold the defense and sometimes counterattack. But when we talk about our counteroffensive, we need US help. Only with the support of the States can we launch counteroffensive actions in 2025, that's true. But it's too early to talk about it yet.
zorro: What do you think about the idea of a reduced truce – an energy truce? After all, our strikes on Russian oil refining are painful and sensitive for the enemy – now we may lose this lever of our pressure on Russia. How long can an energy truce last, if it really begins?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: It's almost the end of March now - what's the point of Russia attacking the energy sector? The most interesting thing is to strike at the energy sector in the winter, in order to create corresponding problems for the Ukrainian population. It is during the winter season that Russia begins such strikes.
And now the Russians can simply start hitting other infrastructure, for example, water supply infrastructure, because summer is approaching, and it will be very hot in 2025. Russia can also simply hit port infrastructure, resume grain terror (we remember how this constantly happened in 2023, how there were constant strikes on the ports of Izmail, Reni, Odesa). Then - there can be banal terror against the civilian population, elementary strikes on high-rise buildings just every night. In this case, we will be limited.
Now issues are being raised, the implementation of which I see no prospect. Moreover, a ceasefire in the Black Sea was discussed in Saudi Arabia, but, excuse me, why is that? After all, Ukraine now dominates the Black Sea. It was we who forced the Russian fleet to go to the bottom of the Black Sea and turn into a flotilla. It was we who forced the remnants of the Russian fleet to flee from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, and they are now squinting in their booths there.
Recently, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's Air Defense Forces conducted a brilliant and very effective operation when naval drones approached the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula and launched drones at Russian air defense systems. A large number of Russian air defense systems and radars were destroyed and damaged.
And in the event of a naval truce, we will not be able to do anything like that, we will not be able to destroy Russian warships, hit Russian air defense systems and military facilities. So what's the point? Protecting the grain corridor? It is now protected as never before, and it is protected by our naval drones, which hunt Russian warships and Russian aircraft in the airspace over the Black Sea every day.
So what kind of truce in the Black Sea? Who will benefit from it? Russia – yes, we – it is not at all beneficial. The same with the strikes on the energy sector: it is not at all beneficial for us now.
I think that these questions are raised in order to see how Russia will react to this, and whether it will disrupt these agreements. But I do not see any practical benefit for Ukraine from these ideas at all. The strikes on Ukraine have been and will not stop until the war is over. But the loss of tools and levers of pressure on Russia, in my opinion, cannot be allowed. This is not beneficial for Ukraine at all.
Editorial: Does Ukraine have the option not to agree to an energy and maritime truce?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: Yes, it should. In general, we can state that the US position is one-sided, we are not satisfied with how the American delegation is working, so we refuse the US as a mediator. But at the same time, we must be prepared for a rather sharp psycho-nervous reaction from Donald Trump, so be it. I have already noted that without the US we can maintain our defense, and our potential is growing every day, because our military-industrial complex is developing, Europe is starting to help us more and more, at least more than in 2022-2024, and Russia is only weakening.
I would also like to note that in the week when we did not receive intelligence from the US, we were able to diversify the sources of such data and began to receive it from our other partners. When the talk began that we could be left without Starlink, we remembered what was before Starlink, and what military communication was used in Ukraine for decades, and, in addition, we found out that there are alternatives to Starlink in other countries, for example, in Sweden. So everything is not so bad. But for the US, it would be a shame.
So for now, we are imitating diplomatic work and waiting for the moment when Trump, while not disappointed in our position, becomes disappointed in Putin. And then a very interesting game will begin.
smiley: If the energy truce works and Ukraine is unable to attack Russian energy, maybe the time will finally come for the Crimean Bridge?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: To strike the Crimean Bridge, we need not drones, which we use to destroy certain objects in the territory of Crimea and the Russian Federation, but real missile weapons with concrete-breaking warheads. For example, there are such samples among ATACMS, but we did not receive them, there are such samples of Taurus, and we did not receive them either. I do not know whether such warheads are being developed for the Ukrainian anti-ship missile R-360 "Neptune", not much is known about the new type of these missiles. But to destroy the Crimean Bridge, we need a large number of cruise or ballistic missiles with a specific warhead, which is a concrete-breaking warhead.
We can make the Crimean Bridge a nightmare with drones. But what effect? It is much more effective not to make the Crimean Bridge a nightmare, without any useful effect, but to strike at Russian refineries, which will burn for several days or even weeks in a row, which will have a moral and psychological effect on the Russians, will please us, and, in addition, will also have a practical effect. When a refinery or oil depot is put out of action and does not work for some time, this creates problems for the enemy with fuel and lubricants. There is also a very interesting point with strikes on tanks, because the fuel stored in the tanks, even if it does not ignite as a result of the strike, but is simply near the epicenter of the fire, becomes substandard and cannot be used. So there is a practical and quite serious effect from such strikes.
Glavred: How do you think Trump will act towards Russia and Ukraine when he sees that his plans for a ceasefire within the next month or two are not being implemented? How big is the threat that he will only persuade our country to make further concessions without touching Russia?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: As I noted, Trump is a casino man. The most negative option for Ukraine involves stopping the supply of weapons and any assistance. Of course, it will be difficult, but… Gradually, we are starting to produce more weapons than our partners, but at the same time we need much more. But if in exchange for assistance from the US we need to give up our own territories and agree to Russia's ultimatums, how will this look in a historical context? How will it look, considering those who gave their lives and health for Ukraine to return to its borders? We cannot betray this memory, and we also need to remember the historical context.
Moreover, Ukraine now has the responsibility to stop the Third World War. Stopping it is not by throwing our paws up and agreeing to all the ultimatums. No, quite the opposite. Stopping it is by refusing to fulfill the aggressor's ultimatums and not agreeing to agreements that will inspire other totalitarian regimes and dictatorships to act like Russia.
After all, other authoritarian regimes will then understand that it is possible to seize other countries and they will get nothing for it, they will negotiate with them. The "world policeman" is already retired. We are not even talking about North Korea or Iran now, but much more broadly. Countries like China may start acting in this way. If China sees that Russia was allowed to seize part of Ukraine, and no one objected - they chatted a little and forgot, it may start acting in the same way towards the Philippines, Vietnam and in general the entire region that the Chinese consider historically theirs. China may well start acting more actively in this region. And the US will be forced to intervene, but it will not, because the president is Donald Trump, and he is not interested in it. Or, perhaps, then Trump will be interested in it, because look how actively he began to use force in Yemen. And this is the person who said that under her all wars would end! The Yemeni Houthis are already feeling it: where is the peacemaking spirit and negotiations? Why aren't the Americans meeting in Saudi Arabia with the Yemeni Houthis and negotiating peace around the world?
The same can apply to other countries, for example, Turkey. Turkey is supposedly friendly to us, but in the Middle East it is unfriendly to many countries. Also, something interesting may happen in a completely unexpected region, for example, in Armenia, Iraq, not to mention Syria, where Turkey has established full control. That is, all this may push countries that have semi-imperial ambitions, like Putin, to similar decisions.
Therefore, Ukraine has a great responsibility. We are being pushed to do something that will lead to a global collapse. But we must stand our ground and not pay attention to what Trump, Witkoff, Waltz and other representatives of the American administration say. We must act in a way that is right for us.
Georgy_59: What, in your opinion, are Trump's interests in Ukraine and this war, and what are the interests of the United States as a state in Ukraine? Accordingly, I would like to understand what surprises - pleasant and otherwise - we can expect from Trump? What could be the consequences for the United States if Ukraine suddenly loses because of Trump?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: Ukraine will not lose because of Trump, I am still optimistic about this issue and believe in our victory.
First of all, Trump is interested in an economic war with China. This is his number one goal. Ukraine is secondary in this context. But the war in Ukraine is on everyone's lips, and it distracts attention. So this issue must be resolved. Donald Trump wanted to resolve it very quickly, but he cannot and will not succeed.
In addition, there is an agreement on rare earth metals. Why does the USA need them? If we talk about the context of the US economic war with China, then China is the main supplier of rare earth metals to most American high-tech enterprises. In the event of an economic war with China, the USA will be left without this resource, enterprises will stop. Therefore, the States need diversification. And Ukraine is the only country that has agreed to an agreement of this plan, which can help the States in this in the future.
Therefore, on the one hand, Ukraine is not very important for Trump, he does not pay attention to it as much as to the future epic historical economic war with China, but on the other hand, he absolutely cannot do without Ukraine: without our rare earth metals, he will simply lose the economic war with China. So, Trump is in a stalemate, and we can even blackmail him with this.
With the rare earth metals deal, we bought Trump, and it was done correctly. The second step here is banal blackmail: if you don't want to, you don't have to, start a war with Beijing like that. For now, we are solving the problem with the occupiers - we are nullifying them, and let the States sort out relations with China, and we will see how this process goes. And we will very quickly see the decline of high-tech enterprises in the United States. And then the stones will fall on Trump's head, and it will also be a big minus for the Republican Party.
Anna (Kyiv): If there is a freeze on the war along the existing demarcation line, what will happen next? Will the war inevitably break out again? Will it then be more bloody and terrible?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: Yes, in this case the war will start again and will be more bloody and large-scale. Because Russia will get the opportunity to accumulate resources. Yes, Ukraine will not sit idly by either, but we still will not have the opportunity to accumulate as many or more forces as Russia. We are talking about both the restoration of the mechanized component and equipment by the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, and human resources. After all, mobilization in Russia will continue. At the same time, we are constantly having some discussions about mobilization.
Russia will simply mobilize 30-40 thousand personnel. This will allow Russia to accumulate 500-600 thousand people in a year, in addition to what it already has. And then, in a year of "truce", Russia will have 1 million 200 thousand personnel of the ground forces. Will we be able to do anything to oppose such an invasion? After all, then Russia will not just fight with infantry and organize "meat assaults", but will use a "meat invasion", huge waves of such invasions.
In addition, this will create the threat of World War III, and this threat will come not only from Russia, which may carry out an operation against Poland, the Baltic states or Finland. Such a threat may come from other countries allied with Russia: Iran, North Korea, etc. Now the whole world is watching how the issue is being resolved with an aggressor country and a terrorist country that has seized the territories of another country, violated international law and destroyed the foundation of the Westphalian system of international relations. Centuries have simply been destroyed by the actions of the Russian Federation. Dictatorships and totalitarian regimes are watching this, motivated and inspired by this example. And they may begin to act in the same way.
Nick: Witkoff stated that providing Ukraine with guarantees, in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Charter, without joining the Alliance is an open question. How likely is it that such guarantees will actually be provided? After all, what is mentioned in Article 5 is, in fact, the key thing that Ukraine would want from NATO, and also the key thing that will infuriate Russia and all of Trump's peace efforts will fail.
Oleksandr Kovalenko: It's not a fact that it will work. At the level of discussion, we can discuss this issue. But when there are agreements, but there is no document that can guarantee anything, it will not work.
I recently had an interview with Danish journalists, and we talked about Greenland, among other things. This is the most striking example. Let's imagine that in a month an American expeditionary force appears near the coast of Greenland, the purpose of which will be to establish a bridgehead on the territory of Greenland. How will Denmark and NATO act when an Alliance country actually attacks a NATO country? They have a dilemma, and they do not understand what to do.
I have no confidence in NATO at all and whether we need this Alliance. Ukraine needs NATO more than NATO does. Does NATO provide any security guarantees to countries that are members of the Alliance? Yes, it does. According to Article 5 of the NATO Charter, member countries will begin to consult on who can help in what way, this is the first stage: someone will say that they will provide tanks, someone that they will provide units, Hungary will say that “this is not our war”, Slovakia will say the same. All this will last a week. And during this time, Estonia will already be completely occupied by Russia, the question of Lithuania, Latvia, and maybe Poland will already arise. This is how Article 5 works.
And we are talking about the operation of Article 5 for a country that is not a member of NATO. In my opinion, this will not work at all. After all, NATO itself is no longer working, and there are also specific unique conditions here. Another Budapest Memorandum? No, I do not believe in it.
Question: To what extent does the continuation of the war depend on Putin remaining in power or alive?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: If you imagine that Putin will be gone tomorrow, everything will still not be resolved quickly. Because the people from his pool who will remain in the leadership, even if they start to vie for Putin's seat, will not be able to immediately turn on the back. But Russian society is not prepared for this. And there will also be internal confrontation in the Russian security structures.
So without Putin, this process will move forward from a dead end, but it won't move quickly.
gf_43: Is the collapse of Russia reality or fiction?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: I have never believed in the collapse of Russia and I do not see such a prospect. But the fact that the Russian Federation can turn into “Russian Feudalization” is a fact. That is, there will be feudal estates in each region, in each district, in each republic there will be its own local oligarch, a farmer. There will be a feudal system, no decentralization. When Putin came to power, the process of centralization of power began in Russia, and now it has reached its peak. In the future, the opposite will happen – decentralization at the level of feudal estates, that is, “Russian Feudalization”.
Dim-dim: Is there even a little bit of "light at the end of the tunnel" now? When, in how many years, can the war end, not be suspended, but rather be completed?
Oleksandr Kovalenko: The war will not end in 2025, it will continue in 2026. But taking into account the potential of the Russian army today, what development prospects it has, and also what development prospects Ukraine has in this matter, Russia's chances are getting smaller and smaller. If this can be perceived as a "light at the end of the tunnel", then yes, there is one. That is why I am not depressed because of the events that are currently taking place in the world, in geopolitics. Ukraine has every chance to win, and to win in the way we understand victory, and not in the way our enemies or our pseudo-friends are trying to impose on us.
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